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Supreme Court Legitimacy: A Turn to
Constitutional Practice
Thomas G. Donnelly*
Commentators offer the Justices consistent—if unsolicited—advice:
tend to the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy. However, to say
this—without saying more—is to say very little. Of course, constitutional
theorists already wrestle with the meaning of legitimacy—its contours, its
complexity, and its influence on the Justices. Political scientists debate the
relationship between institutional concerns and judicial behavior. At the
same time, previous scholars largely ignore issues of constitutional
practice. This is a mistake. In this Article, I take up this neglected topic.
To that end, I detail how the individual Justice might work to bolster the
Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases. Part of the answer turns on legal
craft—identifying the tools available to a Justice as she decides individual
cases. However, part of it also requires adopting a regime perspective—
ensuring that a Justice’s actions meet the challenges of her own
constitutional moment. In my account, Chief Justice Roberts takes
centerstage. Beginning with legal craft, I analyze the tools that Roberts
employs to preserve the Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases—namely,
coalition building, calls for action by the elected branches, incrementalism,
charity for the opposing side, triangulating between constitutional
extremes, and promoting a vision of institutional humility. From there, I
adopt a regime perspective, charting three future paths for the Roberts
Court—each with its own set of challenges for the Justices as they seek to
preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy.

* Thomas G. Donnelly. Senior Fellow for Constitutional Studies, National
Constitution Center; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Princeton University; B.A., Georgetown
University. For their suggestions, encouragement, and inspiration, I extend my deep thanks
to Bruce Ackerman, Paul Frymer, John Kastellec, Stephen Macedo, Jan-Werner Mueller,
Robert Post, Jeffrey Rosen, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Keith Whittington. The views expressed
in this Article are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the Supreme Court’s legitimacy abound.1 It’s
easy to see why.
American politics is divided and volatile. Neither party can
secure political hegemony.2 Each election cycle is highly
competitive.3 The presidency shifts from party to party. And the
same goes for control of Congress. In Washington, polarization is
high.4 Gridlock is pervasive.5 And political compromise is rare.6 At
the same time, these political divisions extend beyond Washington.
Across the country, political partisans divide sharply.7 Faith in
America’s political institutions is at an all-time low.8 And
Americans distrust their government—and one another.9
In the face of this period of polarization and political instability,
the Roberts Court is entering its own period of ideological stasis.
1. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2243 (2019).
2. See MARC J. HETHERINGTON & THOMAS J. RUDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON WON’T
WORK: POLARIZATION, POLITICAL TRUST, AND THE GOVERNING CRISIS 3 (2015).
3. See Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
261, 263, 268 (2015).
4. See MATT GROSSMANN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL
REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 3 (2016); NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE
& HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL
RICHES, at ix, 10, 73–74 (2d ed. 2016); ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER:
ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10–11 (2011); Christopher
Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46 POLITY 411, 413
(2014); Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI.
35, 38 (2000).
5. Lee, supra note 3, at 274–75.
6. Cf. HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 17.
7. See GABRIEL S. LENZ, FOLLOW THE LEADER?: HOW VOTERS RESPOND TO POLITICIANS’
POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE 5–9 (2012); MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW
LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 3 (2009); Larry M.
Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAV.
117, 119 (2002).
8. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
9. See JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 46 (2020).
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With the confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, President
Trump and the Republican Party managed to build a young and
stable conservative majority. Of course, not all conservative Justices
are created equal.10 Judicial biography isn’t destiny.11 And a
Justice’s normative preferences don’t determine her every vote.12
But they do matter—both to public perceptions and to
case outcomes.13
This contrast between political volatility in the elected branches
and ideological stasis on the Supreme Court represents both an
opportunity and a challenge for the Roberts Court’s conservative
majority. Within the elected branches, political divisions often lead
to dysfunction and gridlock.14 This political environment may
empower the Roberts Court—allowing it to act when the elected
branches, especially Congress, cannot.15 At the same time, it may also
present new risks to the Roberts Court’s institutional legitimacy.16
Simply put, Supreme Court legitimacy speaks to the public’s
general support for the Court as an institution.17 As Gregory
Caldeira and James Gibson explain, when the American people
view the Court as a legitimate actor within our constitutional
system, they “may well disagree with” some of the Court’s specific
rulings, while continuing “to concede” its broader authority to
decide cases and settle constitutional issues.18 Over time, the Court
has maintained relatively high and stable levels of public support
—especially when compared to the President and Congress.19 Even
so, the current political environment may place a strain on the
relationship between the American people and the Supreme Court.
10. See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005).
11. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological
Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483,
1483–85 (2007).
12. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 33–36 (1998).
13. See JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 76–85 (2002); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635 (1992).
14. HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 1–2.
15. Lee, supra note 3, at 273–74.
16. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF
CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 299–300 (2019).
17. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 13, at 637.
18. Id.
19. See Jeffrey J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support
for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1115 (1997).
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With political power shifting from election cycle to election
cycle and the Court’s conservative majority locked in place, the
Roberts Court will sometimes—and, perhaps, often—find itself in
conflict with the party in power. Over time, if Democrats find
consistent success in the elected branches and suffer consistent
losses at the Roberts Court, it’s only natural that they may lose faith
in the Supreme Court as an institution.20 Furthermore, if the Roberts
Court itself issues decisions that consistently favor one party’s
political agenda, the American people may come to view the Court
not as a legal institution that transcends partisan politics, but,
instead, as a political institution that serves as a faithful agent of
one of our nation’s political parties.21
In the face of these challenges, commentators have offered the
Justices consistent—if unsolicited—advice: tend to the Supreme
Court’s institutional legitimacy.22 However, to say this—without
saying more—is to say very little. When deciding a constitutional
case, should the Court defer to the elected branches?23
Apply existing precedent?24 Craft a minimalist compromise?25 Stick
to previous methodological commitments?26 Model superb legal

20. See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 968 (2008).
21. Grove, supra note 1, at 2243.
22. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 374
(2009); Linda Greenhouse, The Many Dimensions of the Chief Justice’s Triumphant Term, N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/opinion/supreme-courtroberts-religion.html; Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed,
ATLANTIC (July 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/johnroberts-just-who-supreme-court-needed/614053/; Nina Totenberg, A Powerful Chief and
Unexpected Splits: 6 Takeaways From the Supreme Court Term, N.Y. PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2020),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/a-powerful-chief-and-unexpected-splits-6-takeaways-fromthe-supreme-court-term; Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The Political Genius of John
Roberts,
SLATE
(July
9,
2020,
4:11
PM),
https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/07/political-genius-supreme-court-john-roberts.html; Adam Liptak, John
Roberts Was Already Chief Justice. But Now It’s His Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/john-roberts-supreme-court.html.
23. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134 (1893).
24. See Wallace Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to Judicial Process: A Critique,
57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593, 597 (1963).
25. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 11 (1999).
26. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
126–27 (2018).
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craftmanship?27 Follow the most recent opinion polls?28 Minimize
the risk of public, or elite, backlash?29 Pursue its own sense of
morality or sound policy?30 Or rule in a way that surprises Court
watchers?31 Constitutional advice varies by commentator.
Concededly, many commentators do agree that to preserve the
Court’s legitimacy, the Justices must often set aside their own
policy preferences, transcend partisan politics, and build crossideological coalitions.32 On this view, American politics is
hopelessly polarized.33 The parties divide on nearly every issue.34
Party members despise the political opposition.35 And elected
officials rarely reach compromises that cross party lines.36 By
embracing coalition building, the Justices can prove that the
Supreme Court is different (and better) than the elected branches.
Plus, this advice has an added benefit for Court watchers. It
provides them with a simple proxy for determining when to
celebrate the Court and its rulings—evidence of surprise votes that
cross ideological lines. However, the Court’s legitimacy turns on
more than simple coalition building and a jurisprudence of
surprise. Cross-ideological coalitions err.37 Shoddy legal reasoning
harms the Court’s reputation.38 Unpopular rulings expose the
Court as a group of out-of-touch elites.39 And negative
27. See Felix Frankfurter, The Court and Statesmanship, in LAW AND POLITICS:
OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913–1938, 34, 34–35 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F.
Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939).
28. See Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutional Argument, 73 VAND. L. REV. 73,
131–33 (2020).
29. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 464 (2004).
30. See David A. Strauss, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010).
31. See Noah Feldman, The Supreme Court Is Still Capable of Shocking the Nation,
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/supreme-court-still-capableshocking-191159581.html.
32. See, e.g., GARY J. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 20–22, 181–92 (1977); Rosen, supra note 22; Jonathan Rauch, SCOTUS’ ACA Decision:
An
“Act
of
Judicial
Statesmanship”,
BROOKINGS
(June
28,
2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/scotus-aca-decision-an-act-of-judicial-statesmanship/.
33. Lee, supra note 3, at 263.
34. LEVENDUSKY, supra note 7, at 3.
35. See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 232–66 (2016).
36. HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 17.
37. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (involving both Republican- and
Democratic-appointed Justices uniting behind the doctrine of “separate but equal”).
38. FALLON, supra note 26, at 83–104.
39. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1996).
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consequences undermine the public’s faith in the Court’s practical
wisdom.40 In short, Supreme Court legitimacy requires more than
a politics of compromise.
Of course, the existing literature on Supreme Court legitimacy
already provides a framework for situating the Roberts Court’s
challenge within a broader context.41 Constitutional theorists work
to define the concept of legitimacy, explore its complexity, and
explain how institutional concerns might shape the Court’s
decisions over time.42 At the same time, political scientists address
this topic as part of the discipline’s broader debates over the
dynamics of Supreme Court decision-making.43 Overall, previous
scholars provide powerful accounts of the structural factors and
behavioral forces shaping the Court’s legitimacy at any given
moment. Even so, constitutional theorists and political scientists
alike have spent far too little time on issues of constitutional
practice. This is a mistake.
In this Article, I take up this neglected topic and explore the
relationship between Supreme Court legitimacy and constitutional
practice. To that end, I detail how the individual Justice might work
to bolster the Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases. Part of the
answer turns on legal craft—identifying the tools available to a
Justice as she decides individual cases. However, part of it also
requires adopting a regime perspective—situating a Justice’s
actions within the flow of constitutional time.44 In my account,
Chief Justice Roberts takes center stage. With the confirmation of
Justice Barrett, Roberts may no longer be in control of his own
Court’s destiny. However, his institutionalist sensibility—and his

40. FALLON, supra note 26, at 155–70.
41. See generally Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. POL. 261, 265–72 (2006)
(explaining the value of merging the insights of political science and legal scholarship).
42. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019); FALLON, supra note 26; Grove, supra note 1;
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005).
43. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW
PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019); LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND
THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2008); Lawrence Baum & Neal
Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515
(2010); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003);
Mondak & Smithey, supra note 19, at 1115; Jeffrey J. Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy and
Procedural Justice: Reexamining the Question of Causality, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 599 (1993); Caldeira
& Gibson, supra note 13.
44. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 6.
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approach to concrete cases—may still meet the challenges of the
current constitutional moment.
In Part I, I review the existing literature on Supreme Court
legitimacy—exploring the key contributions of both constitutional
theorists and political scientists. From there, I frame my
own contribution.
In Part II, I address the relationship between Supreme Court
legitimacy and constitutional practice—using Chief Justice
Roberts’s tenure on the Supreme Court as a case study in how an
individual Justice might tend to the Court’s legitimacy as a matter
of legal craft. To that end, I analyze the tools that Roberts himself
employs to preserve the Court’s institutional legitimacy in concrete
cases—namely, coalition building, calls for action by the elected
branches, incrementalism, charity for the opposing side,
triangulating between constitutional extremes, and promoting a
vision of institutional humility. This extended case study is my
central focus—and this Article’s main contribution. While previous
scholars have highlighted the Chief Justice’s institutionalist
mission, no scholar has catalogued—and assessed—the concrete
tactics that he uses to pursue it.
Finally, in Part III, I adopt a regime perspective—situating an
individual Justice’s mission within the politics of a period’s
governing regime.45 To that end, I review the regime politics
literature—exploring how a Justice’s place in constitutional time
might constrain the politics that she may make at any
given moment.46 I frame the Roberts Court’s current challenge
—analyzing the constitutional politics of our polarized age and
exploring how this political environment threatens the Court’s
institutional legitimacy. And I preview the future—charting three
possible paths for the Roberts Court, each with its own set of
challenges for the Justices and their efforts to preserve the Court’s
institutional legitimacy: (1) a Republican political reconstruction,
with the Republican Party leading a new governing regime; (2) a
Democratic political reconstruction, with the Democratic Party
45. For leading accounts of regime theory in political science, see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007) and STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL
CLINTON (1997).
46. See Paul Frymer, Law and American Political Development, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 779,
779–80 (2008); RONALD KAHN & KEN I. KERSCH, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 8 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
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emerging as our nation’s dominant political force; and (3) a political
stalemate, with our nation’s politics remaining competitive and
neither party securing an enduring majority.47
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY:
LEARNING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Scholars have long wrestled with the concept of Supreme Court
legitimacy—and it isn’t hard to understand why.48 The Court
operates within certain institutional constraints.49 The Justices
aren’t elected.50 They serve for life.51 They have no army or police
force of their own.52 As Alexander Bickel explained a half-century
ago, for the Supreme Court’s rulings to have force, the Justices must
secure “the cooperation first of political institutions” and
“ultimately of the American people.”53
In their own influential work on Supreme Court legitimacy,
Gregory Caldeira and James Gibson describe the relationship
between public support for the Court and the Court’s own
institutional authority:
For the Supreme Court, public support bulks especially large; it is
an uncommonly vulnerable institution. The Court lacks an
electoral connection to provide legitimacy, is sometimes obliged
to stand against the winds of public opinion, operates in an
environment often intolerant of those in need of defense, and
has none of the standard political levers over people
and institutions.54

47. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 28–81; SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at
33–58 (1997).
48. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90
(1970) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT].
49. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS
ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 3 (2012).
50. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH].
51. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean’s ed., 1788).
52. See Or Bassok, The Changing Understanding of Judicial Legitimacy, in JUDGES AS
GUARDIANS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 50, 55 (Martin Scheinin, Helle
Krunke & Marina Aksenova eds., 2016).
53. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 48, at 90.
54. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 13, at 635.
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To overcome these obstacles, the Justices must often tend to the
Court’s institutional legitimacy.55
Previous scholarship explores the conceptual framework,
structural factors, and behavioral forces framing this challenge.
Constitutional theorists wrestle with the meaning of
legitimacy—its contours, its complexity, and its influence on the
Justices.56 Political scientists study the public’s attitudes towards
the Court and debate the relationship between institutional
concerns and judicial behavior.57 Overall, this literature provides a
helpful framework for understanding the factors shaping the
Supreme Court’s legitimacy over time. At the same time, it largely
ignores issues of constitutional practice.
In this Part, I explore the contributions of constitutional theory
and political science to debates over Supreme Court legitimacy.
From there, I frame my own contribution.
A. What Constitutional Theory Teaches Us: A Theoretical Framework
for Understanding Supreme Court Legitimacy
Beginning with constitutional theory, Richard Fallon provides
the leading account of Supreme Court legitimacy in the literature.58
For Fallon, the Court’s reputation turns on its ability to balance
between three types of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral.59
Legally, the Justices should use constitutional materials,
arguments, and methodologies that are consistent with the
conventions of legal culture.60 On this view, the Court’s legitimacy
turns, in part, on the fact that the Justices draw on their own legal
expertise in each case to do something that looks like law—not
politics. To reinforce this image, each Justice should adopt a
methodological approach that legal culture recognizes as legitimate
and commit to it over a range of cases.61 As Fallon explains, when
55. See, e.g., BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 48, at 65–72 (describing how the
Court often must negotiate the “tension between principle and expediency”).
56. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 42; FALLON, supra note 26; Grove, supra note 1; Fallon,
supra note 42.
57. See, e.g., DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43; Friedman, supra note 43; Mondak
& Smithey, supra note 19; Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 13.
58. See FALLON, supra note 26; Fallon, supra note 42.
59. See Fallon, supra note 42, at 1790.
60. FALLON, supra note 26, at 35–36.
61. Id. at 127; see also Siegel, supra note 20, at 970 (“Requiring judges to articulate
reasons for their decisions disciplines them to the virtue of consistency—to deciding future
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the Justices maintain methodological consistency over time, “we
can respect their decisions, even if we think that both their
methodological commitments and their substantive conclusions
are ultimately mistaken.”62 Echoing Herbert Wechsler,63 Fallon
predicts that this approach may even lead a Justice to reach case
outcomes that she opposes on policy grounds.64 In Fallon’s view,
this is a “hallmark” of legal legitimacy—proving a Justice’s fidelity
to the law, not to her own policy preferences.65
Sociologically, the Supreme Court should operate as an
institution that is respected by the American people—most notably,
by offering a compelling vision of the Constitution.66 On this view,
the Court may preserve its sociological legitimacy through (at least)
two types of rulings. First, the Court might issue decisions that are
broadly popular with the American people today.67 Second, it
might pursue a path of constitutional redemption—challenging the
American people’s current views in an attempt to secure
future support.68 To that end, the Justices may reach an independent
judgment about the practical benefits of their approach—even if
that approach is in tension with (or in opposition to) existing public
opinion.69 This leads the Justices to make a certain strategic
calculation. While a new ruling may cost the Court sociological
cases according to previously articulated reasons.”). However, Fallon does allow for some
interpretive flexibility—calling on each interpreter to reach a “reflective equilibrium”
between their methodological commitments and their own “provisional, quasi-intuitive
judgments” about the proper outcome in a given case. FALLON, supra note 26, at 127.
62. FALLON, supra note 26, at 131.
63. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1959).
64. FALLON, supra note 26, at 18.
65. Id. Interestingly, Lawrence Lessig looks to complicate Fallon’s account of legal
legitimacy—arguing that legal fidelity often requires a Justice to balance between two key
factors: her own best reading of the law (“fidelity to meaning”) and the expectations of legal
culture (“fidelity to role”). See LESSIG, supra note 42, at 5.
66. FALLON, supra note 26, at 21.
67. Id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 10 (arguing that the Supreme Court often
decides cases within the mainstream of public opinion).
68. FALLON, supra note 26, at 44; see also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 2 (2011) (offering a Supreme Court
narrative rooted in a redemptive vision of American constitutional history); BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 48, at 29 (arguing that the Supreme Court often tries to “predict
the future”). But see Grove, supra note 1, at 2268 (warning that “[a] Justice may not be very
adept at predicting the reaction of the public or the political branches”).
69. FALLON, supra note 26, at 21; see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 249 (2002) (“[T]he real-world consequences of a particular interpretive
decision, valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes, play an important role in
constitutional decisionmaking.”).
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legitimacy today, it may help society (and the Court’s reputation)
in the long run.70
Morally, the Justices should issue decisions that are
normatively attractive—if not to Americans today, then at least to
certain key voices within future generations.71 As Tara Leigh Grove
explains, this evaluation turns in some independent sense on a
Justice’s conclusion about “whether people should treat a legal
regime or its institutions as worthy of respect and obedience; for
example, by virtually any measure, the Nazi regime in Germany
was not . . . morally legitimate” even as it retained the appearance
(and even practice) of formal law in certain areas.72 Of course,
today’s lawyers, elected officials, and citizens will judge the Court’s
decisions from a moral perspective. However, so, too, will future
Americans—especially key voices within the legal (and political)
elite. As a result, the Court sometimes issues decisions that advance
a moral vision today with a future audience in mind—predicting
that history will judge its decisions favorably, even if most (or
nearly all) Americans today do not.
In the end, to preserve the Supreme Court’s institutional
reputation, the Justices must tend to each type of legitimacy: legal,
sociological, and moral. Of course, sometimes these forms of
legitimacy may reinforce one another. However, other times they
may not.73 And while Fallon does provide a useful framework for
understanding the underlying concept of legitimacy, he does so at
a high level of abstraction. As a result, he spends little time on an
individual Justice’s practical task—in other words, how she might
translate Fallon’s conceptual framework into constitutional action
at the case level.74 In this Article, I take up this challenge—moving
from constitutional theory to Supreme Court practice.
70. Id.; see also BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 50, at 71 (exploring
the tension between a Court’s predictive judgments and its commitment to legal fidelity).
71. FALLON, supra note 26, at 21; see also STRAUSS, supra note 30, at 38 (arguing that
judges often turn to independent moral judgments when carrying out their
common-law duties).
72. Grove, supra note 1, at 2244.
73. See, e.g., id. at 2272 (describing the tension between legal legitimacy and
sociological legitimacy).
74. For instance, Fallon argues (correctly) that the Justices should sometimes issue
rulings that express societal values tied to public opinion. FALLON, supra note 26, at 21.
However, like many commentators, he offers few clues for how the Justices might carry out
that form of popular constitutional analysis in concrete cases. For examples of scholars
developing some details of how popular constitutional analysis might work, see Donnelly,
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B. What Political Science Teaches Us: Judicial Decision-Making and
the Mechanics of Supreme Court Legitimacy
Broadly speaking, the political science literature suggests two
key mechanisms shaping the Supreme Court’s institutional
legitimacy over time: the mass public and the legal elite. Both
audiences offer plausible explanations for why a Justice might
moderate her own (legal or policy) views to tend to the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy.
1. The Mass Public, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Dynamics
of Supreme Court Decision–Making
Compared to other institutions, the Supreme Court has
maintained high and stable levels of public support over time.75
This is true even as the Court sometimes issues controversial
decisions on important topics like abortion and religious liberty.76

supra note 28; Tom Donnelly, Judicial Popular Constitutionalism, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 541
(2015); Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343,
343–44 (2013); Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1207 (2010); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 365 (2009); Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional
Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (2007).
75. Mondak & Smithey, supra note 19, at 1115–16.
76. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 3, 14 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (“Under
conditions of the greatest stress—integrating schools, protecting criminals’ rights,
interjecting itself into all types of life-and-death questions, and even deciding a presidential
election—the aggregate level of public confidence in the Court has remained largely
unchanged.”); Friedman, supra note 43, at 2626 (suggesting that “negative feelings” about
the Supreme Court “have a fairly short half-life”); Mondak & Smithey, supra note 19, at 1115
(arguing that “an active and even controversial Court can enjoy strong, stable
aggregate support”).
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Scholars offer a range of explanations for this phenomenon.
Frederick Schauer argues that one factor is “the Court’s own
fostering of its trappings of neutrality and political disinterest.
Robes. A grandiose building. Highly formal ritualized proceedings.
Opinions written as if the results were the product of largely
nonpolitical consultation of highly specialized knowledge not
accessible to ordinary folk.”77 Jeffrey Mondak and Shannon
Ishiyama Smithey add that “the Supreme Court benefits from a link
to basic democratic values,” which is “influenced by the tendency
to view the Court as protector of the Constitution and champion of
justice and civil liberties.”78 Our nation’s schools first introduce
these lessons early in childhood, and few institutions—or
individuals—challenge them later in life.79 Of course, the Justices
themselves also play a key role in the Court’s own success as an
institution—often issuing decisions on high-salience issues that
appeal to the American people and their political leaders.80
When assessing public support for the Supreme Court, Gregory
Caldeira and James Gibson distinguish between two types of
support: specific support and diffuse support.81 Specific support refers
to the mass public’s response to the Court’s rulings in particular
cases and on particular issues.82 Diffuse support speaks to the

77. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s
Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 57 (2006).
78. Mondak & Smithey, supra note 19, at 1123.
79. See Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell
Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 969 (2009).
80. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 22 (analyzing the relationship between public
opinion and Supreme Court decisions over time); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006) (describing how the Supreme Court is
often responsive to public opinion); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006)
(examining how the contours of public debates over the Equal Rights Amendment shaped
the Court’s approach to the Fourteenth Amendment and sex equality); Robert C. Post, The
Supreme Court 2002 Term, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between constitutional culture and
Supreme Court decision-making); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (describing how the Supreme Court
nomination process keeps the Court in touch with public opinion).
81. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 13, at 636–42.
82. Id. at 637. For examples of scholarship that analyzes the public’s views about the
Supreme Court, see PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily,
Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (examining public opinion across a series of
constitutional issues and Supreme Court cases) and Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily
& Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) (analyzing the
public’s views about constitutional interpretation, especially originalism).
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public’s general support for the Supreme Court as an institution.83
As Caldeira and Gibson explain, diffuse support “refers to a
‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to
accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects
of which they see as damaging to their wants.’”84 Importantly, if the
Supreme Court maintains a high enough level of diffuse support,
“a citizen may well disagree with” a given ruling, “but nevertheless
continue to concede [the Court’s] legitimacy as a decision maker.”85
Scholars often draw a connection between diffuse support,
institutional legitimacy, and the dynamics of Supreme Court
decision-making.86 On this view, a Justice might turn away from
her own best reading of the law, or her own substantive
preferences, in order to curry favor with the American people and
their political leaders—in the process, preserving the Court’s
institutional legitimacy, guarding against threats of political
reprisal, and cultivating the individual Justice’s own reputation
among political leaders and the mass public.87 With this dynamic,
public opinion sets parameters for what the Court can do on highsalience issues.88 If the Court stays within those parameters, it has
a considerable amount of freedom to act.89 If it strays from them, it
loses public legitimacy and becomes vulnerable to criticism,
political reprisal, and reputational harm.90 As a result, some Justices
avoid deciding cases—particularly on high-salience issues—in
ways that diverge sharply from public opinion.91
Sometimes this requires a Justice to compromise legal fidelity
or her own policy preferences.92 Sometimes this drives her to
sidestep controversial issues at the expense of minority rights.93
83. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 13, at 637.
84. Id. at 637 (quoting DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE
273 (1965)).
85. Id.
86. Mondak, supra note 43, at 608 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy
enables the Court to elicit some degree of public acceptance of otherwise unpopular
policy actions.”).
87. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2254–58 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
SUPREME COURT (2018)).
88. Klarman, supra note 39, at 17–18.
89. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 4.
90. Id. at 383.
91. See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme
Court? Probably Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. CONST. L.J. 263, 277–79 (2010).
92. Grove, supra note 1, at 2261.
93. Id. at 2261–62.
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Either way, when the Justices exercise forbearance—deciding
against ideological type and building a cross-ideological
consensus—the American people and their elected officials often
celebrate them for their acts of institutional maintenance.94
2. Why the Justices Do What They Do: Legal Elites, Institutional
Legitimacy, and the Inner Lives of the Justices
While the existing political science literature captures many
important aspects of Supreme Court decision-making, Neal Devins
and Lawrence Baum have recently written a powerful rejoinder.95
To be clear, Devins and Baum agree with nearly all scholars that the
Justices are often driven by a desire to push their own policy
preferences, advance their own constitutional visions, and guard
against the risk of political reprisal.96 However, this is not all that
the Justices value. Like most people, the Justices are also influenced
by their own social identities and by the desire to “win approval
from audiences that they care about.”97 And while Devins and
Baum don’t deny that mass opinion may have some influence on
individual Justices,98 they argue that the existing literature has
overstated its importance.99
For Devins and Baum, the Justices overall (and especially
Justices near the Court’s ideological center) care most about the
views of academics, elite practitioners, and Supreme
Court commentators.100 While most Americans ignore the Court’s
day-to-day actions, elite audiences are in a powerful position to
shape the Justices’ reputations—offering either gushing praise or
stinging critiques in law reviews, in newspapers, in professional
journals, at conferences, on blogs, on podcasts, and over social
media.101 For a Justice’s current reputation, the Supreme Court
94. See Justin McCarthy, Approval of the Supreme Court Is Highest Since 2009, GALLUP
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/316817/approval-supreme-court-highest2009.aspx (showing a spike in the Roberts Court’s approval rating after a series of surprising
decisions featuring cross-ideological coalitions).
95. See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43; BAUM, supra note 43; Baum & Devins, supra
note 43.
96. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 10.
97. Baum & Devins, supra note 43, at 1516–17.
98. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 10–11.
99. Id. at 9.
100. See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 10–11; see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 34 (2013).
101. Baum & Devins, supra note 43, at 1543.
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press corps (including traditional journalists, online commentators,
bloggers, and podcast hosts) may exert an outsized influence, as
these voices attract a “wide audience[ ] among elite groups that are
salient to the Justices.”102 At the same time, a Justice’s long-term
reputation often turns on how she is remembered by legal
academics, as memorialized in casebooks, taught in law school
classrooms, and explored in law review articles.103
Devins and Baum argue that a Justice’s preferred audiences will
shape her decision-making in important ways, sometimes pushing
her to deviate from her best reading of the law or her own policy
preferences in order to win favor with an influential reference
group.104 In certain circumstances, this dynamic may drive a Justice
towards the mission of institutional maintenance. By preserving the
Court’s institutional legitimacy, a Justice may bolster her own
reputation (and legacy) among key members of the legal elite, with
this important audience of top-flight practitioners, Supreme Court
commentators, and legal academics often celebrating Justices who
signal through their opinions and their votes that they value the
Court as an institution more than their own policy preferences.
Elite lawyers are the keepers of our nation’s constitutional
memory.105 They shape judicial reputations, and, in the process,
help build the constitutional canon.106 Many Justices want to be
remembered by later generations—and for the right reasons. For
some, this is the allure of embracing the role of Supreme Court
institution builder.
C. Action and Constraint: The Dynamics of Judicial Decision-Making

102. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 44–45.
103. For examples of previous attempts to assess the reputation of Supreme Court
Justices, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 5–7 (2008); WILLIAM DAVID
BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES (2004); ALBERT P.
BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978); Robert C. Bradley, Who Are the Great
Justices and What Criteria Did They Meet?, in GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
(William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 1993).
104. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 147.
105. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7 (2014).
106. For leading scholarship addressing the constructions of the constitutional canon
and anticanon, see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011); Mark Tushnet,
The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187 (2000); J.M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998);
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998).
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and the Challenges of Tending to the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy
In a powerful new book, Jack Balkin analyzes our current
constitutional moment. Drawing on a blend of constitutional theory
and political science, Balkin argues that our nation’s constitutional
politics is the story of three separate constitutional cycles: a cycle of
rising and falling regimes, a cycle of polarization and
depolarization, and a cycle of constitutional rot and renewal.107
Together, these three patterns of constitutional change interact to
“generate” (what he calls) “constitutional time.”108
For Balkin, no single actor is responsible for our current
moment, a moment characterized by a “crumbling . . . [political]
regime,” high levels of political polarization, and a constitutional
system rotten to its core—not Donald Trump, not the Roberts
Court, and not any single political party or social movement.109
Furthermore, no single actor can save us from this moment’s many
pathologies—not even a politically insulated Supreme Court. On
this view, while each Justice does have the power to shape her own
legacy—through her votes, her opinions, and her relationships with
her colleagues—no Justice can ever fully escape the constraints of
constitutional time.110 Sometimes a period’s constitutional context
empowers her.111 Sometimes it constrains her.112 Either way, the
cycles of constitutional change shape her political power and define
her decision-making options.113
Balkin’s scholarship is a useful corrective for accounts that
overemphasize the Court’s power to transform our nation’s
constitutional politics, whether advanced by attitudinalists in
political science departments,114 constitutional theorists in law
schools,115 politicians on the campaign trail,116 activists attacking the

107. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 4, 6 (“To understand what is going on today in the United
States, we have to think in terms of political cycles that interact with each other and create
remarkable—and dark—times.”).
108. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).
109. Id. at 64.
110. Id. at 69–80, 112.
111. Id. at 85.
112. Id. at 86.
113. Id. at 81–96.
114. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 6–11.
115. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132 (1978).
116. See ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE
SURPRISING POLITICAL CAREER OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT 1–14 (2007).
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Court’s most recent ruling,117 or members of the general public
reeling from our politics of polarization and constitutional rot.118 At
the same time, Balkin spends far too little time on what
constitutional actors, including the Justices, might do at the
individual level to navigate this difficult political environment.
This is a mistake.
To capture the challenge of tending to the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy, scholars must strike the right balance between
emphasizing individual action and structural constraint, the
choices the Justices make, and the background forces that constrain
those choices. While the existing literature offers scholars a helpful
framework for understanding the factors driving the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy over time, much work remains to fill in the
details of constitutional practice. In this Article, I make a start. Part
of the answer turns on legal craft—the tools available to the
individual Justice as she tends to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy
in concrete cases. However, part of it also requires adopting a
regime perspective to ensure that a Justice’s actions meet the
challenges of her own constitutional moment. I consider each of
these components, in turn.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY, AND
LEGAL CRAFT: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Commentators must resist the urge to absolve the Justices of
responsibility for the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. While potent
structural forces frame the Court’s institutional challenges, the
Justices themselves remain powerful actors within our
constitutional system.119 They serve for life.120 They don’t have to
worry about reelection.121 They remain among our nation’s most
respected public officials.122 They rarely face serious court-curbing
threats.123 And they hold real formal power.124
117. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
240 (2004).
118. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 63.
119. Grove, supra note 1, at 2243; Lee, supra note 3, at 273.
120. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 267 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean’s ed., 1788)
(describing federal judges who “behave properly” as “secured in their places for life”).
121. BICKEL, supra note 50, at 19.
122. See McCarthy, supra note 94.
123. FALLON, supra note 26, at 157.
124. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

1505

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

Given their political insulation, public prestige, and practical
authority, the Justices can decide cases and craft opinions in ways
that promote the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Or not. It’s up to
them, both individually and institutionally. But what can the
individual Justice do in concrete cases? What specific tools does she
have at her disposal? And what are the tradeoffs involved in
adopting different approaches to legal craft? Abstract advice and
theoretical musings won’t do. Moving forward, scholars must
address issues of constitutional practice.
For those Justices interested in preserving the Court’s
institutional legitimacy, they might begin—as I do in this Part—by
studying the track record of Chief Justice Roberts. Since the
beginning of his tenure on the Supreme Court, Roberts has framed
his own mission as defined by certain institutionalist virtues. In an
early interview with Jeffrey Rosen, the Chief Justice explained,
“[T]he Court is . . . ripe for a . . . refocus on functioning as an
institution, because if it doesn’t it’s going to lose its credibility and
legitimacy . . . .”125 Since then, Roberts has often spoken about how
important it is for the Justices to stay above politics and protect the
Court’s institutional reputation.126
Of course, Roberts has both written and joined muscular
decisions that divided the Justices along ideological lines.127 No
Justice passes the test of institutionalist leadership in all cases and
for all time. Even so, Roberts’s words—and, in many cases, his
actions—suggest a certain institutionalist instinct.
In this Part, I use Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure on the Supreme
Court as a case study for how an individual Justice might tend to
the Court’s institutional legitimacy as a matter of legal craft,
analyzing the tools that Roberts employs in concrete cases to
pursue his institutionalist mission. These tools include coalition
building, calls for action by the elected branches, incrementalism,
charity for the opposing side, triangulating between constitutional
extremes, and promoting an image of institutional humility.

125. Jeffrey
Rosen,
Roberts’s
Rules,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
2007),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/.
126. See Adam Liptak, Politics Has No Place at the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/politics/chiefjustice-john-roberts-interview.html.
127. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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My goal is not to provide a comprehensive account of the Chief
Justice’s track record as an institutionalist or to offer a full-throated
defense (or critique) of his tenure. Instead, I seek to use illustrative
examples to show the various ways in which the Chief Justice has
promoted the practice (and appearance) of institutionalist
leadership on today’s Court and explore the lessons that the Chief
Justice’s tenure might teach us about the practical challenges of
exercising this sort of leadership in a polarized age.
Scholars and commentators often call on the Chief Justice to
tend to the Court’s institutional legitimacy.128 This is how he does it.
A. Coalition Building
Perhaps the central institutionalist virtue is successful coalition
building. To protect the Supreme Court’s reputation, it’s essential
for the Justices to maintain the Court’s image as a legal institution—
not one that’s doing mere partisan politics.129 This is central to the
Chief Justice’s stated mission.130
While National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) v.
Sebelius is Roberts’s most famous example of coalition building—
with the Chief Justice joining with his progressive colleagues to
protect the core of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against an
important constitutional challenge131—he has managed to build
cross-ideological coalitions in a string of important cases. Roughly
speaking, these cases fall into three different categories.
First, as with NFIB, Roberts delights in building coalitions on
both sides of a single high-profile case, confounding efforts to
categorize his moves as either conservative or progressive. Take
Department of Commerce v. New York.132 There, the Court considered
a challenge to the Trump Administration’s effort to add a
citizenship question to the U.S. Census.133 The Court split on both
128. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 22; Totenberg, supra note 22; Lithwick & Stern,
supra note 22; Liptak, supra note 22; Michael O’Donnell, John Roberts’s Biggest Test Is Yet to
Come, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/03/johnroberts-biography-review/580453/; Jeffrey Rosen, Big Chief, NEW REPUBLIC (July 12, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/104898/john-roberts-supreme-court-aca.
129. FALLON, supra note 26, at 35–41.
130. Rosen, supra note 125.
131. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (building three separate coalitions—two
cross-ideological and one ideological—in an important constitutional challenge to the
Affordable Care Act).
132. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
133. Id. at 2561.
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the substantive reading of the Constitution’s Enumeration Clause
and the case’s practical outcome.134 Roberts commanded the
majority on both fronts. On the one hand, Roberts joined with his
conservative colleagues to uphold the executive branch’s authority
to ask a citizenship question under the Enumeration Clause.135 On
the other hand, he joined with his progressive colleagues to uphold
the district court’s conclusion that the Commerce Department’s
official explanation was a mere pretext.136 By offering a partial
victory to each side, Roberts resisted simple ideological
characterization—preserving the government’s authority to ask the
question, while also removing the citizenship question for now.
Second, Roberts tries to build majorities that blur ideological
divisions and expand beyond bare five-to-four coalitions—
especially when these moves lead to decisions that defy
expectations. This move is especially powerful when applied to a
range of high-profile cases within a single Term.137
For instance, consider October Term 2019. There, Chief Justice
Roberts and his colleagues faced one of the most challenging and
consequential lineups in recent memory, with blockbuster cases on
abortion, immigration, LGBTQ rights, religious liberty, President
Trump’s financial records, and the mechanics of the Electoral
College.138 Furthermore, the Justices had to decide these closely
134. Id. at 2576, 2584–85.
135. Id. at 2566.
136. Id. at 2573-76.
137. Chief Justice Roberts has also built cross-ideological coalitions in cases covering a
single issue-area across multiple Terms. For instance, he has forged cross-ideological
coalitions in one of the fastest-moving areas in the Court’s jurisprudence: digital privacy. See
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (joining the Court’s progressives to
challenge the government’s attempt to secure a defendant’s cell-site records without a
warrant); Riley v. California, 575 U.S. 373 (2014) (leading a unanimous Court to require a
warrant before the police may search the digital information on a cell phone seized from an
arrestee). Most famously, he has built multiple coalitions to save the core of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA). See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (rejecting a statutory
challenge (with constitutional undertones) that would have undermined the ACA’s health
care exchanges in a six-to-three ruling that attracted the vote of one of the NFIB dissenters,
Justice Anthony Kennedy); NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 519 (building various crossideological coalitions to save the core of the ACA in the heat of an election year).
138. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, With Wave of Major Rulings, Roberts and Supreme Court
Emerge as Powerful Counterweight to Trump and Congress, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/10/with-wave-major-rulingsroberts-supreme-court-emerge-powerful-counterweight-trump-congress/; Adam Liptak &
Alicia Parlapiano, The Supreme Court Aligned with Public Opinion in Most Major Cases This
Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/15/us/supremecourt-major-cases-2020.html.
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watched cases in the middle of an election year featuring a
polarizing President and two of the biggest crises in recent
memory: a deadly pandemic and an economic meltdown. While
many commentators anticipated a conservative rout, the Court
went on to issue a string of surprising rulings in many of the Term’s
blockbuster cases—a mix of both conservative and progressive
victories, with many featuring cross-ideological coalitions.139
After the Term, the Chief Justice received much of the praise for
these rulings, and it’s easy to see why.140 As the Court’s median
Justice, Roberts held the pivotal vote in most cases.141 And as the
Court’s Chief Justice, he decided who should speak for the Court
when he was in the majority—which was in nearly every case.142
Many commentators concluded that Roberts used these powers to
forge a politics of compromise.143 Sometimes the Chief Justice built
cross-ideological coalitions that extended beyond a bare majority—
on LGBTQ rights, religious liberty, the Electoral College, and
President Trump’s financial records.144 Other times he defected
from his conservative colleagues and provided the crucial fifth vote
to the Court’s progressives on abortion, immigration, and
California’s coronavirus response.145
Of course, the Court did sometimes divide along ideological
lines; for instance, on vouchers for religious schools, the President’s
control over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
challenges to various states’ restrictive voting laws.146 Even so, for
many commentators, October Term 2019 was a clear example of the
Chief Justice exercising constitutional leadership—brokering
139. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Chief Justice Roberts Gave Everyone Something to Call a Win,
CNN (July 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/09/politics/john-robertssupreme-court/index.html.
140. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 22.
141. Martin et al., supra note 10, at 1275–76.
142. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 81–85 (1964).
143. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, This Is the Real John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/opinion/john-roberts-supreme-court.html.
144. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020); Chiafalo v. Washington,
140 S. Ct. 2316, 2319 (2020); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2372 (2020); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,
140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020); Trump v. Mazars USA, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2026 (2020); Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (2020).
145. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901
(2020); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
146. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020); Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
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compromises between his colleagues, avoiding ideological rulings
whenever possible, and realizing his vision of a Court standing
above partisan politics.147
Third, the Chief Justice deftly managed a Court legitimacy crisis
during the Senate battle over President Obama’s nomination of
Merrick Garland. With an eight-Justice Court, Roberts worked with
his colleagues to carry on with the Court’s business and avoid
embarrassing four-to-four deadlocks. The Chief Justice didn’t
always succeed,148 but perhaps the Court’s most notable effort was
in Zubik v. Burwell, a high-profile challenge to the ACA’s
contraception mandate.149 There, the Court ordered supplemental
briefing after oral argument to assess the possibility of issuing a
decision that avoided reaching the case’s merits. The Court asked
both parties to address whether an insurance company might
provide contraceptive coverage to the challengers’ employees
without involving the challengers directly in the process.150 Both
sides confirmed that this option was “feasible.”151 Roberts and his
colleagues then issued a per curiam opinion, sending the case back
to the lower courts for further consideration and avoiding a fourto-four split in one of the Term’s most closely watched cases.152
In the end, Chief Justice Roberts has, of course, written and
joined aggressive opinions issued by conservative (bare)
majorities.153 Even so, Roberts has shown an institutionalist instinct
to reach out for consensus.

147. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Aligning with Liberals on DACA and LGBTQ Rights, Chief
Justice John Roberts Asserts His Independence, USA TODAY (June 19, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/06/19/daca-lgbtq-chief-justicejohn-roberts-displays-independent-streak/3216259001/.
148. See, e.g., Friedrichs v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (dividing four-to-four
in a high-profile First Amendment case involving public sector union fees); United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (dividing four-to-four over a case involving an important Obama
Administration immigration policy).
149. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
150. Id. at 1559–60.
151. Id. at 1560.
152. Id. at 1561. Importantly, this compromise largely held last Term in Little Sisters of
the Poor—a seven-to-two ruling, with Justices Breyer and Kagan joining the Court’s
conservatives. 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2367 (2020). There, the Court rejected challenges by states to
Trump Administration rules allowing private employers to opt out of the ACA’s
contraception mandate for religious or moral reasons. Id. at 2372–75.
153. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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B. Calls for Action by the Elected Branches
One of the Chief Justice’s favorite moves—especially when
authoring a muscular decision for the Court’s conservative
majority—is to call on Congress (or other political actors) to remedy
any adverse consequences arising from the Court’s ruling. A pose
of judicial modesty, this move is often designed to address concerns
about the counter-majoritarian difficulty, blunt substantive attacks
from a progressive dissent, and anticipate criticisms from both elite
audiences and the mass public.154
For instance, consider Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court’s
landmark partisan gerrymandering decision.155 There, the Chief
Justice wrote a majority opinion for the Court’s conservatives,
concluding that partisan gerrymandering claims were
nonjusticiable.156 This decision shut down further litigation in the
federal courts and closed off a constitutional debate that extended
(at least) as far back as the Court’s 2004 decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer.157 While some commentators defended the Chief Justice’s
opinion as an act of constitutional forbearance, many criticized it
for blocking the most effective venue for reform, thereby replacing
(possible) action by life-tenured judges with (probable) obstruction
by self-interested politicians.158
Anticipating this criticism, Roberts highlighted a range of
successful reform efforts in the states and emphasized the various
pathways still available to future reformers. For instance, at the
state level, reformers might continue to push for proposals to shift
redistricting decisions to an independent commission, create an
office of “state demographer” tasked with drawing district lines, or
craft new statutory (or constitutional) language offering a precise
definition of partisan gerrymandering for state courts to apply to
154. See LESSIG, supra note 42, at 17; BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note
50, at 41; Cass R. Sunstein, If the People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?,
60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 158–59 (2007); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
155. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
156. Id. at 2508.
157. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
158. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2523 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
“harms” of partisan gerrymandering “arise because politicians want to stay in office” and
arguing that, therefore, “[n]o one can look to them for effective relief”); Adam Liptak,
Supreme Court Bars Challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-gerrymandering.html
(highlighting the range of reactions to the Rucho decision).
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challenges brought under state law.159 Depending on the state,
reformers might look to the state legislature, the state’s voters, or
both in their efforts for reform.
Roberts also emphasized Congress’s power to attack partisan
gerrymandering under the Constitution’s Elections Clause by
describing past congressional efforts to address the problem and
even highlighting a recent Democratic House bill that would “ban
partisan gerrymandering” nationwide and “require States to create
15-member independent [redistricting] commissions . . . .”160 While
Roberts “express[ed] no view” on the constitutionality of any
particular proposal, he explained that “the avenue for reform
established by the Framers, and used by Congress in the past,
remains open” even after the Rucho decision.161
In the end, the Chief Justice frequently invites the elected
branches to respond to his rulings.162 Critics dismiss this move as a
cynical ploy—with the Chief Justice striking a pose of modesty
while still pushing his own substantive agenda.163 In our polarized
world, the elected branches—especially Congress—rarely act.164
Because of the various veto points in our political system, each
party struggles to build a working majority in the elected branches,
even when it manages to win the presidency and majorities in both
the House and the Senate.165 As a result, congressional responses to
Supreme Court decisions are vanishingly rare.166

159. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507–08.
160. Id. at 2508.
161. Id.
162. The examples are numerous. See, e.g., Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (“Our severability analysis does not foreclose Congress
from pursuing alternative responses to the problem—for example, converting the
[Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] into a multimember agency.”); McCutcheon v. FEC,
572 U.S. 185, 223 (2014) (striking down aggregate campaign contribution limits, but
highlighting “multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the
Government’s . . . interest, while avoiding ‘unnecessary abridgment’ of First Amendment
rights”); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (concluding that the Voting Rights
Act’s coverage formula was outdated and unconstitutional but explaining that “Congress
may draft another formula based on current conditions”).
163. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in
Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389 (2015) (describing the Court’s
decision in Shelby County as “mark[ing] the death of the VRA as a superstatute”).
164. Lee, supra note 3, at 274.
165. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 1–20 (1998).
166. See generally Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme
Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013) (describing how the rise in polarization has
made it difficult for Congress to pass legislation that responds to Supreme Court decisions).
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On this view, in a case like Rucho, Roberts, the politically savvy
Chief Justice, knew that the Republican Senate wouldn’t take up
the Democratic House’s election reform bill. And yet, he used the
rhetoric of interbranch dialogue anyway, reaping both the
rhetorical gains of a conciliatory tone and the practical benefits of
increased Supreme Court power in an age of gridlock.
Even so, this move, whether sincere or merely rhetorical, is still
a key tactic available to the institutionalist Justice. Viewed
charitably—and used within a well-functioning political system—
it remains one way for the Court to offer constructive suggestions
to the elected branches and promote constitutional dialogue
between the Court and key political actors.167
C. Incrementalism
When looking to reshape the law, Chief Justice Roberts prefers
to move incrementally. Even in areas where Roberts has pushed the
law in a new direction, he has tended to prefer a slower approach
than many of his colleagues, with seismic shifts coming only after
the legal groundwork has already been prepared by previous—
more modest—decisions. By shifting the law incrementally, the
institutionalist Justice prepares key audiences for constitutional
change, thereby satisfying craft virtues that appeal to legal elites,
providing the elected branches with the opportunity to act
preemptively, and avoiding abrupt shifts that might spur
public backlash.168
This is one way of understanding the Chief Justice’s approach
in Shelby County v. Holder.169 There, Roberts’s opinion for the
Court’s conservative majority gutted one of the nation’s most
celebrated laws: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). However, the
Chief Justice set the foundation for this muscular decision four
years earlier in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number
One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, a separate challenge to the VRA.170

167. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 655–58,
668–80 (1993).
168. See KLARMAN, supra note 29, at 464; David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of
Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 859–60 (2009); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATION 13, 16 (1990).
169. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
170. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)
[hereinafter NAMUDNO].
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Under the VRA’s preclearance requirement, certain
jurisdictions must submit proposed election law revisions to the
national government for approval before those laws may go into
effect.171 The VRA includes a coverage formula for determining
which jurisdictions must satisfy this requirement, but this formula
is based on data covering voting rights abuses from over three
decades ago.172 Prior to NAMUDNO, the VRA’s critics had long
argued that the continued use of this formula and its old data to
determine the reach of the VRA’s preclearance requirement
was unconstitutional.173
In NAMUDNO, the Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion for
seven of his colleagues, dodging the constitutional question.174
While Roberts expressed concerns about the VRA’s
constitutionality—especially in light of improved conditions in the
South—he relied on constitutional avoidance to offer a strained
reading of the statute, allowing a municipal utility district in Texas
to bail out of the VRA’s preclearance requirement.175 In short, the
Chief Justice was able to forge an unlikely coalition in a closely
watched case to avoid reaching the merits of a constitutional
challenge to the VRA, getting credit for his leadership while
preparing the legal groundwork for Shelby County.
Fast-forward four years to Shelby County itself. There, Roberts
began his majority opinion for the Court’s conservatives by striking
a modest pose, acknowledging that invalidating “an Act of
Congress ‘is the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called on to perform.’”176 He then gestured to the cross-ideological
ruling in NAMUDNO, explaining, “That is why, in 2009, we took
care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act to do so, and instead resolved the case then before us on
statutory grounds. But in issuing that decision, we expressed our
broader concerns about the constitutionality of the [VRA].”177
Finally, Roberts chided Congress for failing to act, arguing that the
Court’s hands were tied: “Congress could have updated the
171. See id. at 198.
172. Id. at 203.
173. See Brief for Pac. Legal Found., Ctr. for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21 as
Amicus Curiae of Supporting Appellant, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-332), 2009
WL 526207, at *19.
174. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 193.
175. Id. at 203.
176. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 556–57.
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coverage formula . . ., but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us
today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) [defining the VRA’s
coverage formula] unconstitutional.”178
In addition, Roberts sometimes looks to cabin—rather than
overrule—problematic precedent, using his opinions to declare
broad principles without casting aside or unsettling wellestablished constitutional doctrine. For instance, consider Seila Law
v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.179
In response to the Great Recession, Congress established the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent
agency responsible for promoting consumer protection in the
financial industry.180 Traditionally, Congress structured
independent agencies around multimember boards.181 However,
rather than following this historical practice, Congress delegated
the CFPB’s broad authority to a single Director—nominated by the
President, confirmed by the Senate for a five-year term, and
removeable only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.”182
The challengers argued that the CFPB’s novel structure—an
agency with broad powers led by a single Director insulated from
presidential removal—violated the Constitution’s separation of
powers.183 The Supreme Court agreed, in a five-to-four decision
dividing the Court along ideological lines.184 In his majority
opinion, the Chief Justice advanced a broad vision of presidential
power. For Roberts, the President’s removal power is essential to
Article II’s overall structure, empowering the President to
supervise executive-branch officials and ensure that the laws are
“faithfully executed.”185 In Roberts’s view, the Founding generation
wrote this vision into the Constitution.186 The First Congress and its

178. Id. at 557. The Roberts Court made a similar move on the issue of public sector
union fees. See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014).
179. Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2183 (2020).
180. Id. at 2191.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2193 (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(c)(1), (3)).
183. Id. at 2192.
184. Id. at 2190–92.
185. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
186. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
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successors confirmed it in practice.187 And Chief Justice Taft
weaved it into constitutional doctrine.188
Of course, this is only part of the story. Prior to Seila Law, the
Supreme Court had already upheld previous congressional efforts
to insulate both agencies and individual officials from presidential
supervision.189 In her dissent, Justice Kagan read these previous
rulings broadly—upholding the CFPB’s structure and arguing that
Congress had considerable authority to limit the President’s
removal powers.190 In contrast, Roberts framed these same rulings
narrowly—not as broad grants of power to Congress, but instead
as narrow exceptions to the general rule: a broad presidential
removal power.191 While Roberts expressed no interest in
overruling longstanding precedent or challenging the
constitutionality of well-established agencies, he also refused to
extend these rulings to cover a powerful new one with “no foothold
in history or tradition.”192
In short, Roberts’s Seila Law opinion offered a blend of boldness
and restraint. He invalidated the CFPB’s structure—making its
Director removeable at-will by the President.193 He offered a broad
vision of presidential power. And he trimmed back on Congress’s
authority to limit the President’s ability to supervise the executive
branch. At the same time, he limited his ruling’s doctrinal sweep
(and its practical consequences)—refusing to overrule precedent,
question the constitutionality of old agencies, or dismantle the
CFPB itself. While Roberts’s opinion increased the President’s
power to supervise the agency, it preserved the CFPB’s broad
authority to protect consumers.194
In the end, incrementalism need not entail substantive modesty.
To his critics, Roberts may move more slowly than his conservative
187. Id.
188. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
189. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel
Act); Humphrey v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the Federal
Trade Commission).
190. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2224–25 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 2206 (majority opinion) (refusing to read Humphrey as “a freestanding
invitation for Congress to impose additional restrictions on the President’s
removal authority”).
192. Id. at 2202. The Court made a similar move a decade earlier. See Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
193. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
194. Id. at 2210–11.
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colleagues, but he still pursues an ambitious agenda. Sometimes he
attacks landmark statutes.195 Sometimes he cabins well-established
doctrine.196 And sometimes he patiently shifts the law—beginning
with modest rulings that attract cross-ideological coalitions and
ending with five-to-four decisions that reshape the law in the Chief
Justice’s own image.197 Even so, Roberts has often signaled a
preference for moving more slowly than many of his colleagues—
and in the process, promoting certain institutionalist virtues.
D. Charity for the Opposing Side
The institutionalist Justice understands that she must
sometimes reach conclusions that divide the American people
—and even the Justices themselves. However, when weighing in
on hot-button issues, she often signals respect for reasonable
arguments on all sides—and especially those offered by the
opposing side.198 While Chief Justice Roberts is not shy about using
sharp rhetoric, he sometimes practices this institutionalist virtue.
For instance, consider the Chief Justice’s dissent in Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo.199 There, the Roberts Court
agreed to block an executive order issued by the New York
Governor limiting attendance at religious services during the
coronavirus pandemic.200 This was the Roberts Court’s first
coronavirus case following the confirmation of Justice Amy Coney
Barrett. It addressed an important (and controversial) topic—one
that split the American people along partisan lines.201 Furthermore,
it divided the Justices themselves, yielding three separate dissents—
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice

195. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
196. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
197. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2246 (2020) (issuing
a five-to-four decision along ideological lines—building on Trinity Lutheran to strike down a
Montana law banning the use of school vouchers for private religious schools); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2037 (2017) (building a sevento-two majority to strike down a law banning public funds to a religious institution for
playground supplies).
198. Siegel, supra note 20, at 969.
199. See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
200. Id. at 66.
201. See Lydia Saad, Americans Less Amenable to Another COVID-19 Lockdown, GALLUP
(Nov. 11, 2020, 7:52 PM), https://news.gallup.com/poll/324146/americans-less-amenablecovid-lockdown.aspx (showing declining public support for coronavirus restrictions, with
sharp divisions by party identification).
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Sotomayor.202 In turn, Justice Gorsuch responded with a biting
concurrence—accusing his dissenting colleagues of “disregard[ing]
the First Amendment in times of crisis.”203
In contrast, the Chief Justice approached each side of this case
with a charitable spirit. Roberts began by recognizing that the
Governor’s order “raise[d] serious concerns under the
Constitution”—signaling his agreement with the majority on the
merits.204 Even as he dissented in Cuomo itself for technical reasons,
the Chief Justice shared the majority’s view that the New York
order was distinguishable from earlier ones upheld by the Court
and acknowledged that he might strike a “different” balance “than
the other dissenting Justices” in future coronavirus challenges—
giving great weight to the religious liberty interests implicated by
these cases.205
Even so, Roberts defended the good-faith arguments advanced
by his progressive colleagues—challenging Gorsuch’s mocking
tone and his blistering critique:
To be clear, I do not regard my dissenting colleagues as “cutting
the Constitution loose during a pandemic,” yielding to “a
particular judicial impulse to stay out of the way in times of
crisis,” or “shelter[ing] in place when the Constitution is under
attack.” . . . They simply view the matter differently after careful
study and analysis reflecting their best efforts to fulfill their
responsibility under the Constitution.206

In Roberts’s view, Cuomo raised difficult constitutional issues—
with reasonable arguments on all sides. As a result, the case called
for charity—not vitriol.
The Chief Justice has taken a similar approach when addressing
opposing views advanced by various parties in important cases.
For instance, take the Chief Justice’s dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges.
There, the Court issued a ruling striking down same-sex marriage
bans in states throughout the country.207 While Roberts challenged
the majority’s constitutional conclusions in the case, he also

202. See Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 76 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(issuing a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan); id. at 78 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (issuing a dissent joined by Justice Kagan).
203. Id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting id. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).
207. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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signaled respect for the LGBTQ community and its supporters. To
that end, he acknowledged the appeal of marriage equality as a
matter of policy.208 He conceded the power of many of the personal
narratives driving the majority’s decision.209 And he urged the
winners to celebrate the case’s practical outcome.210 In the end,
Roberts’s approach was in sharp contrast with Justice Scalia’s harsh
rhetoric in earlier LGBTQ rights cases.211
The Chief Justice also showed charity towards the losing side in
NFIB v. Sebelius. Even as Roberts voted to uphold the ACA’s
individual mandate, he kept faith with many of the constitutional
objections raised by the ACA’s conservative critics. Of course, he
even reached out to decide the Commerce Clause issue in their
favor—drawing fire from the Court’s progressives and raising
questions among many commentators about his commitment to
legal craft.212
To signal agreement with the ACA’s critics, Roberts drew on
many familiar arguments from the public debates over the
landmark statute. He highlighted the ACA’s physical length—
observing that its “10 titles stretch[ed] over 900 pages and
contain[ed] hundreds of provisions.”213 He emphasized the ACA’s
practical effects, explaining that the individual mandate would
force “healthy, often young adults” to purchase health insurance
against their will (and, perhaps, against their interests).214 And he
even offered a version of the critics’ (in)famous “broccoli”
argument—by far the most popular criticism of the ACA from a
constitutional perspective.215
208. Id. at 686 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in
social policy and considerations of fairness.”).
209. Id. at 699 (“[T]he compelling personal accounts of petitioners and others like them
are likely a primary reason why many Americans have changed their minds about whether
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.”).
210. Id. at 687 (“Many people will rejoice at this decision, and I begrudge none
their celebration.”).
211. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is part of a law-profession culture, that
has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda.”).
212. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 624 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (“I see no reason to undertake a
Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determinative.”).
213. Id. at 538–39.
214. Id. at 556 (explaining that young people “are less likely to need significant health care”).
215. See id. at 554 (“Under the Government’s theory, Congress could address the diet
problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.”); Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W.

1519

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

Importantly, the Chief Justice also signaled respect for many of
the substantive constitutional claims underlying the critics’ public
arguments—celebrating
the
importance
of
federalism,
emphasizing the limits on the national government’s power, and
expressing sympathy for the conservative legal movement’s push
to trim back on the excesses of the New Deal Revolution.216 He
echoed conservative claims that the ACA represented an
“unprecedented” expansion of national power.217 And he even
expressed agreement with the challengers’ reading of the ACA’s
text itself.218
Of course, the challengers still lost both of these cases.
Expressions of charity aside, the Chief Justice did reject the LGBTQ
community’s attempt to lay claim to the Constitution in Obergefell—
reducing their constitutional claims to mere policy preferences.219
And he did protect the ACA’s most controversial feature, its
individual mandate—granting the challengers a moral victory, but
not a substantive win on policy.220
To Roberts’s critics (and, of course, to the challengers in these
cases), it’s easy to see how the Chief Justice’s expressions of charity
may ring hollow—or, even worse, sound patronizing. Even so,
Roberts did retain a charitable spirit in each of these cases—
Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case,
61 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 66 (2013) (exploring the power of the “broccoli” argument in
public discourse).
216. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 533 (“In our federal system, the National Government
possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”); id. at 538
(“Our deference in matters of policy cannot . . . become abdication in matters of law.”); id. at
557 (“The proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because
of prophesied future activity finds no support in our precedent.”). For an influential example
of this new-wave libertarian scholarship, see Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:
Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
581 (2010).
217. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 549 (“Congress has never attempted to rely on [the Commerce
Power] . . . to purchase an unwanted product.”).
218. Id. at 562.
219. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This
move is especially problematic because the Obergefell challengers did have powerful
constitutional arguments on their side, rooted in the Constitution’s text and history. See
generally Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (offering an originalist argument that same-sex marriage bans
are unconstitutional).
220. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 563; see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2417,
2417–19, 2423 (2018) (upholding President Trump’s travel ban, but also showing charity for
the losing side by quoting President Trump’s anti-Muslim statements, contrasting them with
famous presidential speeches on religious tolerance, and attacking Korematsu v.
United States).
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signaling respect for all sides even as he decided cases addressing
some of our nation’s most divisive constitutional issues.221
E. Triangulating Between Constitutional Extremes
When deciding concrete cases, Chief Justice Roberts often
triangulates between constitutional extremes. Sometimes Roberts
uses this approach to shape public perceptions about his own
aggressive rulings, using the extreme positions of his conservative
colleagues to frame his chosen approach as a moderate
alternative.222 Other times the Chief Justice crafts solutions that
attract support from both conservative and progressive Justices—
charting a middle path between the assertive arguments advanced
by each party in a single case. For example, consider the Court’s
recent decisions addressing President Trump’s financial records—
Trump v. Vance and Trump v. Mazars USA.223
There, the President challenged subpoenas issued by a New
York grand jury and three congressional committees.224 These cases
raised vexing—and novel—constitutional questions, calling on the
Court to weigh important interests (and serious consequences) on
all sides.225 While President Trump advanced broad claims of
presidential immunity, both Congress and the New York District
Attorney tied their subpoenas to core institutional powers—
namely, Congress’s power to legislate and a grand jury’s power to
conduct criminal investigations.226
221. Siegel, supra note 20, at 969.
222. See, e.g., Seila Law L.L.C. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2210–11
(2020) (using severability—and a separate opinion written by Justice Thomas taking a more
aggressive position—to frame Roberts’s majority opinion in an ideologically divisive ruling
as a moderate approach); McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 232 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Chief Justice’s approach to McCutcheon as “yet
another missed opportunity to right the course of our campaign finance jurisprudence by
restoring a standard that is faithful to the First Amendment”). But see Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down school
desegregation plans and fracturing the Court along ideological lines—and further dividing
the conservative wing, with Justice Kennedy staking out a more moderate position than the
Chief Justice).
223. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct.
2412 (2020).
224. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2026; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
225. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (“From President Washington until now, we have
never considered a dispute over a congressional subpoena for the President’s records.”);
Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (noting that this was the first time the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether the President must respond to state criminal subpoenas).
226. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
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Furthermore, each side made aggressive constitutional
arguments advancing their own institutional interests—in the
process, threatening a number of key principles, including
federalism and the separation of powers. Taken to the extreme,
President Trump’s claims risked placing the President above the
law.227 District Attorney Vance’s arguments threatened to empower
popularly elected (and partisan) prosecutors to harass a President
from the opposing party.228 And Congress’s broad assertions of
both legislative and investigatory power risked gifting
congressional committees a decisive advantage over the President
in future separation-of-powers battles.229 In both Vance and Mazars,
Roberts staked out a position that triangulated between these
extremes. Importantly, he also built cross-ideological coalitions
committed to this approach—even attracting the votes of President
Trump’s two appointees at the time, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.
In Vance, the Chief Justice demonstrated the power of
constitutional framing. Rather than addressing whether the
President had to turn over his financial records to a New York
grand jury, Roberts focused squarely on the President’s broad
assertion of absolute immunity from state criminal investigation—
using the President’s extreme position as a helpful constitutional
foil.230 While the Justices divided over some of the case’s
constitutional specifics, all nine Justices—including the two
dissenters, Justices Alito and Thomas—rejected the President’s
aggressive claim of absolute immunity.231 From there, Roberts built
a cross-ideological coalition around an opinion that blended a
healthy dose of John Marshall (and the famous Burr treason trial),
two centuries of presidential practice, and the constitutional vision
advanced in canonical cases like United States v. Nixon.232 In the end,
this coalition embraced a broad constitutional principle: “In our

227. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2033; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2420.
228. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2428 (“[H]arassing subpoenas could, under certain
circumstances, threaten the independence or effectiveness of the Executive.”).
229. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2026 (“The President contends that the House lacked a valid
legislative aim and instead sought these records to harass him, expose personal matters, and
conduct law enforcement activities beyond its authority.”).
230. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2420 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether Article II and
the Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.”).
231. Id. at 2429.
232. Id. at 2425.
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judicial system, ‘[t]he public has a right to every man’s’”—
including the President’s—”‘evidence’”233
Turning to Mazars, the Chief Justice wrestled with the challenge
of setting new separation-of-powers baselines in a polarized era of
non-stop constitutional hardball.234 In the past, the elected
branches—and opposing parties—settled their disputes without
turning to the courts, each side using its institutional powers to
reach an uneasy (and often bitter) compromise.235 Roberts even
detailed some recent examples—using the stories of Presidents
from both parties to highlight this historical practice.236 The political
battles weren’t pretty, but the elected branches resolved them on
their own—without recourse to the courts.237 Not anymore.238
In response, the Chief Justice charted a path between the
extreme positions advanced by both the President and Congress.239
To that end, he built a new doctrinal framework—rooted in
historical practice and balancing the legitimate institutional
interests of both branches.240 On the one hand, the Chief Justice
looked to curb congressional abuses of the subpoena power—
limiting Congress’s authority to use broad subpoenas to harass a
sitting President and distract him from his important
responsibilities.241 On the other hand, Roberts sought to check
President Trump’s broad assertions of presidential power—
making it clear that the President and Congress were co-equal
branches of government.242 Above all, Roberts tried to craft a

233. Id. at 2420 (quoting 12 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 693 (1812)).
234. See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
523 (2004).
235. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2026 (2020).
236. Id. at 2030 (using examples from Presidents Reagan and Clinton).
237. Id. at 2029 (“Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential
documents have not ended up in court.”).
238. Id. at 2031 (“Congress and the President maintained this tradition of negotiation
and compromise—without the involvement of this Court—until the present dispute.”).
239. Id. at 2035 (seeking a “balanced approach”).
240. Id. at 2026 (“Congress and the President—the two political branches established
by the Constitution—have an ongoing relationship that the Framers intended to feature both
rivalry and reciprocity. . . . That distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of the
question before us.”) (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 2034 (“Far from accounting for separation of powers concerns, the House’s
approach aggravates them by leaving essentially no limits on the congressional power to
subpoena the President’s personal records.”).
242. Id. at 2033 (“The standards proposed by the President . . . would risk seriously
impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities.”).
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helpful framework to shape future battles between the President
and Congress—and, perhaps, offer them a path away from the
courts and back to the negotiating table.243
Finally, the Chief Justice refused to settle the ultimate question
in each case: whether the President had to hand over his financial records.
Instead, the Court sent both cases back to the lower courts—kicking
off a fresh round of litigation guided by the Court’s new rulings.244
As a result, the Chief Justice crafted outcomes that defied easy
characterization—with some commentators reading them as wins
for the President (and artful dodges by the Chief Justice),245 others
viewing them as a powerful rebuke to the President’s aggressive
assertions of power,246 and still others concluding that it was a
split decision.247
Vance and Mazars were both triumphs for the Chief Justice’s
push to triangulate between constitutional extremes. For the
institutionalist Justice, this move sometimes helps to push the
Court closer to areas of popular constitutional consensus and
dampen the threat of widespread public backlash.248 At the same
time, critics may fear that this same move might allow savvy

243. Id. at 2035 (building a new doctrinal test and instructing the lower courts to
“perform a careful analysis that takes adequate account of the separation of powers
principles at stake, including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the
‘unique position’ of the President”).
244. See id. at 2036; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431.
245. See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Dealt a Huge Blow to Congress’s Power to
Investigate
Trump,
VOX
(July
9,
2020,
1:27
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/7/9/21318612/supreme-court-trump-mazars-vance-john-robertssubpoenas-tax-returns.
246. See, e.g., Michael Waldman, Opinion, Trump May Have Won the Political Battle. But He
Lost
the
Constitutional
One,
WASH.
POST
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/09/trump-may-have-won-politicalbattle-he-lost-constitutional-one/.
247. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court Rejects Trump’s Imperious Arguments on Subpoenas, But It
Doesn’t
Go
Far
Enough,
WASH.
POST
(July
9,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-court-rejects-trumps-imperious-argumentson-subpoenas-but-it-doesnt-go-far-enough/2020/07/09/50a62af2-c215-11ea-b4f6cb39cd8940fb_story.html.
248. Donnelly, supra note 28, at 110–32. Early—if crude—evidence suggests that the
Chief Justice embraced positions consistent with public opinion in most of the recent Term’s
blockbuster cases. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, The Supreme Court Aligned with
Public Opinion in Most Major Cases This Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/15/us/supreme-court-major-cases2020.html.

1524

1525

Supreme Court Legitimacy

Justices to steer clear of the appearance of constitutional extremism,
even as they pursue an ambitious agenda.249
F. The Pursuit of Institutional Humility
The institutionalist Justice cares about the Supreme Court’s
proper role within our constitutional system.250 This often leads her
to pursue the path—or, at least, strike a pose—of institutional
humility.251 This move is at the core of the Chief Justice’s vision
—with Roberts often preaching about the limited powers of the
Court, the virtues of judicial restraint, and the perils of legislating
from the bench.252 By embracing this path, the Chief Justice looks
to bolster the Court’s institutional legitimacy—advancing a vision
of a constrained Court engaged in law (not politics), legal analysis
(not policymaking), and deliberative decision-making (not
reflexive partisanship).253
To his critics, Roberts’s expressions of institutional humility
ring hollow—reading like little more than Supreme Court
boilerplate.254 After all, the Chief Justice sometimes does embrace
muscular decisions that divide the Court ideologically, unsettle
well-established precedent, and gut landmark statutes.255 However,
read charitably, these words express Roberts’s genuine
commitment to a certain vision of institutional maintenance.
Importantly, the Chief Justice has often lived up to this vision of
institutional humility in practice, engaging in a range of moves that
advance it across a number of cases: deferring to the elected
branches, adopting a purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation, applying technical legal doctrines (like
constitutional avoidance and severability), and embracing stare
249. See, e.g., Leah Litman, Progressives’ Supreme Court Victories Will Be Fleeting,
ATLANTIC (July 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/courtgave-progressives-hollow-victories/614101/; Editors, Roberts Misrules, NAT’L REV. (June 29,
2020, 7:10 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/supreme-court-abortiondecision-chief-justice-john-roberts-misrules/.
250. Frankfurter, supra note 27, at 34–35.
251. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV.
40, 41 (1961).
252. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 125.
253. FALLON, supra note 26, at 35–36.
254. See, e.g., Jeff Shesol, John Roberts Is No Hero, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 5:55 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/06/john-roberts-is-hardly-the-hero-andjudicial-statesman-people-make-him-out-to-be.html.
255. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2006).
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decisis. In this Section, I use illustrative examples to explore each
move, in turn.
1. Deference to the Elected Branches
To advance a vision institutional humility, Roberts sometimes
follows a familiar path: deference to the elected branches. Within
constitutional theory, this approach extends back (at least) to 1893,
with James Bradley Thayer’s famous account in the Harvard Law
Review.256 It has appealed to a range of voices across generations—
perhaps, most notably, to Felix Frankfurter.257 And even if no
Justice—including John Roberts (or even Frankfurter himself)—has
embraced it in every case, it remains a powerful alternative to
judicial supremacy.
For instance, let’s return to the Chief Justice’s dissent in
Obergefell. There, while Roberts acknowledged that public opinion
was shifting in the direction of marriage equality, he refused to
write this emerging popular consensus into constitutional
doctrine.258 Instead, he argued that the key question in the case was
one of institutional role—the question of who should decide the
issue of marriage equality.259 For Roberts, the answer was clear: the
elected branches, not the Supreme Court.260
The Chief Justice used his Obergefell dissent to offer a history
lesson about the dangers of Supreme Court policymaking. He
embraced many of his Harvard Law School predecessors—
connecting his vision of a constrained Court to arguments
advanced by other prophets of judicial restraint like Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Friendly, and
John Marshall Harlan II.261 Furthermore, Roberts celebrated the
nation’s debate over marriage equality—and the public’s evolving
256. Thayer, supra note 23, at 144 (urging courts to only invalidate a law when the
legislature has “not merely made a mistake,” but has “made a very clear one,—so clear that
it is not open to rational question”).
257. Snyder, supra note 74, at 345.
258. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686–713 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 688 (“Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in
my judgment, the institution of marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It
is instead about whether, in our democratic republic, that decision should rest with the
people acting through their elected representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold
commissions authorizing them to resolve legal disputes according to law.”).
260. Id.
261. See id. at 687, 696–97, 701, 705–06 (quoting Brandeis, Friendly, Harlan and Holmes);
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
REPUBLIC 29–55 (2015) (describing Harvard’s constitutional legacy).
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views on the issue—fearful that the Court’s decision might close off an
important constitutional discussion and result in public backlash.262
Importantly, the Chief Justice also offered his own theory of
institutional legitimacy—drawing a direct connection between
Obergefell and, in his view, previous judicial mistakes like Lochner
v. New York.263 As Roberts explained, the Court’s authority (and, in
his own words, “legitimacy”) “flow[] from the perception—and
reality—that we exercise humility and restraint in deciding cases
according to the Constitution and law.”264 However, in Roberts’s
view, “the majority’s approach” in Obergefell had “no basis in
principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of
judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such
as Lochner . . . .”265
Roberts then outlined his own conception of the Court’s proper
institutional role—one sensitive to the relationship between legal
expertise, public opinion, and institutional reputation:
[A] much different view of the Court’s role is possible. That view
is more modest and restrained. It is more skeptical that the legal
abilities of judges also reflect insight into moral and philosophical
issues. It is more sensitive to the fact that judges are unelected and
unaccountable, and that the legitimacy of their power depends on
confining it to the exercise of legal judgment. It is more attuned to
the lessons of history, and what it has meant for the country and
Court when Justices have exceeded their proper bounds.266

This passage ties together some of Roberts’s favorite themes,
including judicial modesty, institutional legitimacy, and the
importance of legal expertise.267
While Roberts’s Obergefell dissent advanced a conservative
substantive outcome, he has also embraced judicial restraint when
it has led him to side with the Court’s progressives. For instance,
consider the Chief Justice’s approach to one of the first coronavirus
cases to reach the Supreme Court: South Bay United Pentecostal
262. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 687 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Supporters of same-sex
marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their fellow citizens—through the
democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today.”).
263. Id. at 694.
264. Id. at 708.
265. Id. at 694.
266. Id. at 712–13.
267. We see similar themes in the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB. See, e.g., NFIB v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012) (“[W]e possess neither the expertise nor prerogative to make
policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders . . ..”).

1527

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

Church v. Newsom.268 There, to slow the spread of the coronavirus,
the California Governor issued an executive order placing a limit
on the size of various public gatherings—including religious
services—throughout California.269 The challengers called on the
Court to block the enforcement of the Governor’s order, arguing
that it violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.270
In this early case, the Court turned away the challenge in a fiveto-four ruling, with the Chief Justice breaking with his
conservative colleagues.271
Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, wrestling with the case’s
central tension—how to strike the right balance between the
Constitution’s protection of individual rights and the traditional
police powers of the states in the middle of a global pandemic. The
Chief Justice settled on a constrained role for the Court, embracing
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s century-old vision of federalism in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts272 and granting state officials considerable
deference to craft a policy response to meet the challenges of a
public health emergency.273 On this view, the states have
substantial powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens, while the Court has only limited competence—and even
less authority—to assess the wisdom of a state’s policy choices.274
Turning to the specifics of the case itself, Roberts concluded that
the state’s policy was consistent with the First Amendment’s
protection of religious liberty.275 Under the Governor’s order,
California had placed restrictions not just on religious services,
but also on similar secular gatherings like public lectures and
sporting events.276 At the same time, the state granted exemptions
to activities like operating a grocery store that didn’t involve
“people . . . congregat[ing] in large groups” and “remain[ing] in
close proximity for extended periods.”277

268. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); see also
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
269. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. at 1613.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
273. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. at 1613.
274. Id. at 1613–14.
275. Id. at 1613.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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In the end, Roberts refused to second-guess the state’s policy
judgment—especially given the case’s specific context, with a party
“seek[ing] emergency relief” and with local officials “actively
shaping their response to changing facts on the ground.”278 At the
same time, Roberts didn’t shut the door to future constitutional
challenges, stressing that those decisions would turn on similar
fact-specific inquiries. As the Chief Justice explained, “The precise
question of when restrictions on particular activities should be
lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter
subject to reasonable disagreement.”279 This is a classic Roberts
move—narrowing the reach of a specific ruling, while still setting
down constitutional markers and preserving a key role for the
Court (and himself) in future challenges.
Of course, with the passage of time and with the tragic death of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Roberts Court has begun to
reverse course in this area—checking some state pandemic policies
and embracing some constitutional limits on the police powers of
the states.280 Even so, Roberts himself continues to embrace the
virtues of institutional humility in this challenging context—
acknowledging the important religious interests implicated by
these cases even as he tries to steer the Court clear of politically
perilous issues whenever possible.281
2. A Purposivist Approach to Statutory Interpretation
To advance a vision of institutional humility, Roberts
sometimes embraces a purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation—particularly
in
high-profile
cases
with
constitutional undertones. For the purposivist, the central goal of
statutory interpretation is (not surprisingly) to interpret a statute’s
text in a way that realizes Congress’s purpose.282 To be clear, the
purposivist doesn’t ignore a statute’s text. However, she does
sometimes allow extrinsic evidence of congressional purpose—like
278. Id. at 1614.
279. Id. at 1613.
280. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (per curiam)
(blocking an executive order issued by the Governor of New York limiting attendance at
religious gatherings in certain areas of New York City).
281. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that “[t]here is simply no need” to
grant injunctive relief and rule on the “serious and difficult” constitutional “question” in this
case because the Governor has already granted relief to the challengers).
282. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332–33 (1990).
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statements from a statute’s legislative history or her understanding
of the paradigm “evil” that Congress sought to address—to
outweigh the most natural reading of the statute’s text.283
To purposivism’s critics, this statutory approach risks
empowering judges and permitting them to read their own
purposes into statutes enacted by Congress. On this view, it is
better to stick to the statute’s text, downplay (or ignore) extrinsic
evidence, and steer clear of the murky terrain of congressional
intent.284 However, viewed charitably, a purposivist approach
subordinates a Justice’s own policy preferences to Congress’s
broader vision—preventing drafting errors, clumsy writing, or
legal technicalities from subverting a statute’s central purpose.
Roberts has sometimes used purposivism in this way.285
For instance, a mere three years after NFIB, the Roberts Court
confronted another legal challenge to the ACA in King v. Burwell—
this time, a statutory challenge (with a healthy dose of federalism)
arguing that the ACA’s text meant that individuals in states with
federal exchanges couldn’t receive tax credits to help them buy
health insurance.286 While the challengers made a plausible textual
argument, Roberts pushed it aside, offering a charitable reading of
a key progressive statute and attracting the support of one of the
NFIB dissenters, Justice Kennedy.287 In the process, Roberts
surprised many observers by building a strong cross-ideological
majority and rejecting efforts to allow legal technicalities to destroy
the sitting President’s landmark achievement.288 Instead, Roberts
embraced (what he took to be) the statute’s central purpose—
increasing the American people’s access to affordable health care—
283. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 70–71 (2006).
284. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1308–09,
1330–42 (2020).
285. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (joining a six-tothree majority to adopt a purposivist reading of the Clean Air Act and uphold a new EPA
rule addressing interstate air pollution). But see Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) (joining a six-to-three majority and embracing a textualist approach to Title VII).
286. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Brief for Professors Thomas W. Merrill et
al. as Amici Curia Supporting Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No.
14-114) (explaining the constitutional dimensions of the case—focusing especially
on federalism).
287. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484.
288. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey, Surprised that King v. Burwell Was 6-to-3?, WASH. POST (June
26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/26/surprisedthat-king-v-burwell-was-6-to-3/ (highlighting the range of surprised reactions to the King decision
by commentators from across the ideological spectrum).
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and interpreted the statutory provisions at issue in King in a way
most consistent with that vision.289
3. Technical Legal Doctrines: Constitutional Avoidance and Severability
To advance a vision of institutional humility, Roberts
sometimes applies technical legal doctrines like constitutional
avoidance and severability. Sometimes he uses these doctrines to
narrow the scope of a ruling.290 Sometimes he uses them to avoid
conflict with the elected branches.291 And sometimes he uses them
to save a statute’s core provisions even as he strikes down others.292
All told, these legal doctrines allow the institutionalist Justice to
steer clear of threats to the Court’s legitimacy (like public backlash)
and vindicate the processes of popular lawmaking (by protecting a
statute’s core provisions).293
For instance, consider the Chief Justice’s use of constitutional
avoidance in NFIB.294 There, as part of his constitutional analysis,
Roberts endorsed the challengers’ interpretation of the ACA’s
individual mandate as the most natural reading of the statute.295
However, he went on to conclude that his hands were tied by
precedent—namely, the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance.296 As Roberts explained, “[I]t is well
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which
violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that
does not do so.”297 Furthermore, as in Obergefell, Roberts traced his
approach to the commands of (Harvard-educated) legal giants like
Joseph Story and Oliver Wendell Holmes.298

289. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485–87.
290. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207–08.
291. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012).
292. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2015).
293. Grove, supra note 1, at 2245.
294. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562; see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (using constitutional avoidance to dodge a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act).
295. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562 (“The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it
commands individuals to purchase insurance.”).
296. Id. at 562–63 (“Under our precedent, it is therefore necessary to ask whether the
Government’s alternative reading of the statute—that it only imposes a tax on those without
insurance—is a reasonable one. . . . Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to
federal statutes, it can be so read . . . .”).
297. Id. at 562.
298. Id. at 562–63.
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The Chief Justice embraced a separate doctrine—severability—
to avoid the threat of institutional harm in Seila Law.299 There, the
Court struck down a key part of the Dodd-Frank Act—eliminating
a provision curbing the President’s removal power and, as a result,
making the CFPB Director removeable at-will by the President.300
At the same time, the Chief Justice used severability to limit the
ruling’s reach—jettisoning the faulty provision while leaving the
rest of the law in place.301
In his severability analysis, Roberts stressed institutional
humility, focusing on how severability ensures that even as the
Court exercises its power of judicial review, it works to preserve as
much of Congress’s statutory vision as possible. As Roberts
explained, “[W]hen confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,
we try to limit the solution to the problem, severing any
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.”302 While
the Court had no authority to “re-write Congress’s work by
creating offices, terms, and the like,” it did have a duty to honor the
democratic process and protect a statute’s core provisions.303
Turning to the Dodd-Frank Act itself, Roberts concluded that
its removal provision was severable from the rest of the Act. In his
view, the Act’s other provisions “remain[ed] fully operative
without the offending tenure restriction.”304 Furthermore, he saw
“nothing in the text or history of the Dodd-Frank Act that
demonstrate[d] Congress would have preferred no CFPB to a CFPB
supervised by the President.”305 In short, “Congress . . . prefer[red]
that” the Court “use a scalpel rather than a bulldozer in curing the
constitutional defect.”306 By using severability to preserve much of
the Act, Roberts settled for an opinion that expressed a broad

299. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207–08 (2020); see
also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2015) (using
severability in a similar way). While Justices Thomas and Gorsuch refused to join that part
of the Chief Justice’s opinion, Roberts managed to build a cross-ideological coalition on
severability—combining the Court’s progressives and two of his fellow conservatives
(Justices Alito and Kavanaugh). See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
300. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
301. Id. at 2207–08.
302. Id. at 2209 (citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508).
303. Id. at 2211.
304. Id. at 2209.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2210–11.
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constitutional vision but had only a modest practical effect on the
CFPB itself.307
4. Stare Decisis
Finally, to advance a vision of institutional humility, Roberts
sometimes embraces stare decisis. By following the principles set
out in previous rulings, an institutionalist Justice honors the
wisdom of her predecessors.308 She vindicates important rule-oflaw values—ensuring consistent treatment of similar cases and
promoting stability in the law.309 And she establishes a coherent
(and reliable) framework for decision makers outside of the courts,
allowing them to plan, coordinate, and act.310
Of course, most Justices hold their own strong views about both
the law and policy.311 Chief Justice Roberts is no exception.
Sometimes these views shape his approach to certain areas of the
law—for instance, his push to rebalance the relationship between
church and state.312 However, other times he allows the
“gravitational force of precedent” to constrain him—permitting
previous rulings to outweigh his own independent constitutional
judgment in specific cases.313 For instance, consider the Chief
Justice’s approach to June Medical Services v. Russo—the most
powerful example of Roberts embracing stare decisis in a highprofile case.314
There, the Supreme Court reviewed a Louisiana law requiring
doctors to secure admitting privileges in local hospitals before
performing abortions.315 Abortion providers challenged the law as
an undue burden on a woman’s access to an abortion.316 Four years
307. Id. at 2211.
308. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and
Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 755–57 (2002).
309. Post, supra note 168, at 16.
310. See John M. Finnis, Law as Co-ordination, 2 RATIO JURIS 97, 100 (1989).
311. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 7.
312. See Michael W. McConnell, On Religion, The Supreme Court Protects the Right to Be
Different, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/supremecourt-religion.html.
313. See DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 112.
314. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). The Chief Justice also
joined Justice Alito’s dissent in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1426 (2020)—one of
Roberts’s few losses in October Term 2019. In his Ramos dissent, Alito relied heavily on the
power of precedent. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
315. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
316. Id.
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earlier, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court struck
down a similar Texas law in a five-to-four decision, with Justice
Kennedy joining the Court’s progressives.317 This time, Roberts
cast the decisive vote, breaking with his conservative colleagues
and voting with the Court’s progressives to strike down the
Louisiana law.318
While the Chief Justice had dissented in Whole Woman’s Health,
he reversed course in June Medical, choosing to apply Court
precedent. Roberts used this act of self-denial to frame important
lessons about institutional humility—exploring the value of the
law-politics distinction, the dangers of judicial policymaking, and
the virtues of stare decisis. For instance, Roberts began his June
Medical concurrence by highlighting his vote four years earlier in
Whole Woman’s Health—even emphasizing that he “continue[d] to
believe that the case was wrongly decided.”319
At the same time, he framed June Medical not as an opportunity
to relitigate the past, but instead as an important moment to reflect
on the value (and bite) of stare decisis, observing, “The question
today . . . is not whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong,
but whether to adhere to it in deciding the present case.”320 From
there, Roberts explained, “[F]or precedent to mean anything, the
doctrine must give way only to a rationale that goes beyond
whether the case was decided correctly”—for instance, factors like
a precedent’s “administrability, its fit with subsequent factual and
legal developments, and the reliance interests that the precedent
has engendered.”321 This analysis should be “pragmatic and
contextual,” not “mechanical.”322
For Roberts, stare decisis promoted a range of institutionalist
virtues. It constrained judges and guarded against the dangers of
judicial policymaking.323 It promoted fairness and predictability in

317. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582 (2016).
318. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2134.
322. Id. at 2135.
323. Id. at 2134 (“The constraint of precedent distinguishes the judicial ‘method and
philosophy from those of the political and legislative process.’”) (quoting Robert H. Jackson,
Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334 (1944)).
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the law.324 It drew on the practical wisdom of previous judges.325
And overall, it preserved the Court’s institutional “integrity”—
proving that the law wouldn’t shift with the political winds or an
individual Justice’s personal whims.326 In the process, the Chief
Justice drew on a range of voices from the constitutional canon (and
from across the ideological spectrum), including William
Blackstone, William Brennan, Edmund Burke, Alexander
Hamilton, Robert Jackson, and Antonin Scalia.327
In the end, Roberts explained his vote in June Medical directly
(and concisely):
Stare decisis instructs us to treat like cases alike. The result in this
case is controlled by our decision four years ago invalidating a
nearly identical Texas law. The Louisiana law burdens women
seeking previability abortions to the same extent as the Texas
law . . . . For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court that
the Louisiana law is unconstitutional.328

The Chief Justice’s June Medical concurrence represents one of his
clearest expressions of institutional humility in any
constitutional case.
G. Conclusion: Tending to the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy
in a Polarized Age—The Challenge of Meeting Today’s
Constitutional Moment
In this Part, we addressed issues of constitutional practice—
using Chief Justice Roberts’s track record to identify the tools
available to a Justice as he or she works to bolster the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy in concrete cases. However, this institutionalist
mission calls for far more than clever tactics and an embrace of legal
craft. To succeed, a Justice’s actions must meet the demands (and
constraints) of her own constitutional moment. In short, the
institutionalist Justice must adopt a regime perspective.
324. Id. (“Adherence to precedent is necessary to ‘avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts[.]’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Gideon ed., 2001)).
325. Id. (explaining that stare decisis is “grounded in a basic humility that recognizes
today’s legal issues are often not so different from the questions of yesterday and that we are
not the first ones to try to answer them”).
326. Id. (observing that stare decisis protected the “‘perceived integrity of the judicial
process’”) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
327. Id. at 2134–36.
328. Id. at 2141–42.
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III. THE ROBERTS COURT IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME: THE VALUE
OF ADOPTING A REGIME PERSPECTIVE
Today’s constitutional moment presents its own set of
opportunities and challenges for the Roberts Court. With our
political parties polarized and our elections competitive, neither
party has taken control of our nation’s politics.329 This period of
political stalemate strengthens the Roberts Court—shifting power
away from the elected branches and towards the judiciary.330 To
many commentators, the Court’s conservative majority seems in
control of our nation’s constitutional politics. However, the
constitutional present features a more complex story than that, and
the future is even less certain.
Of course, commentators have long predicted the collapse of
Republican power and the emergence of a new Progressive Era—
fueled by a combination of demographic trends, generational
replacement, and rising inequality.331 These predictions began with
President George W. Bush, the Iraq War, and the Great Recession.332
They accelerated with the election of Barack Obama and a powerful
Democratic majority in Congress.333 And they stalled for a time
with the rise of the Tea Party, the resurgence of congressional
Republicans, and the election of Donald Trump.334 But even then,
the Trump Administration itself provided a springboard for a new
wave of progressive optimism.335
Within the legal academy, Jack Balkin offers the most recent
(and prominent) installment of this argument on behalf of a new
329. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 10.
330. Lee, supra note 3, at 272–73.
331. For the classic statement of this argument, see JOHN B. JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE
EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY (2002).
332. See Gerard N. Magliocca, George W. Bush in Political Time: The Janus Presidency,
34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2009).
333. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE
AND REAPPRAISAL 167–94 (2d ed. 2011).
334. See Richard Kreitner, What Time Is It? Here’s What the 2016 Election Tells Us About
Obama,
Trump,
and
What
Comes
Next,
NATION
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-time-is-it-heres-what-the-2016election-tells-us-about-obama-trump-and-what-comes-next/.
335. See Thomas B. Edsall, The Fight Over How Trump Fits in With the Other 44 Presidents,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/opinion/trump-historypresidents.html; Scott Lemieux, Is Donald Trump the Next Jimmy Carter?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/140041/donald-trump-next-jimmy-carter;
Julia Azari, Trump’s Presidency Signals the End of the Reagan Era, VOX (Dec. 1, 2016, 10:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/12/1/13794680/trump-presidencyreagan-era-end.
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Progressive Era.336 In Balkin’s view, the Reagan regime is
collapsing.337 Donald Trump is a symptom of its decline.338 And the
Democratic Party is poised to complete a reconstruction of our
nation’s politics—winning a series of elections, building a genuine
governing majority, and constructing a new constitutional
regime.339 While Balkin hedges in certain places,340 he marshals an
impressive array of evidence in support of this constitutional
prophecy, drawing on a range of academic disciplines, including
history, political science, and constitutional theory.341
Even so, scholars should approach Balkin’s predictions with a
degree of caution. Generally speaking, scholars make for lousy
prognosticators. Previous predictions of a progressive realignment
have fallen flat. And even the 2008 election (and a once-in-ageneration political talent like Barack Obama) proved to be—at
best—a false dawn for the progressive community. In the end,
Balkin presents one plausible vision of America’s future. However,
other futures are possible.
In this Part, I adopt a regime perspective. To that end, I review
the regime politics literature—situating the institutionalist Justice’s
mission within the constraints of a period’s governing regime. I
analyze the constitutional politics of our polarized age—exploring
the various challenges that this political environment presents to
Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues. And finally, I sketch three
future paths for our nation’s constitutional politics, each with its
own set of challenges for the Roberts Court and its efforts to
preserve its own institutional legitimacy: (1) a Republican political
reconstruction, with the Republican Party leading a new governing
regime; (2) a Democratic political reconstruction, with the
Democratic Party emerging as our nation’s dominant political force;
and (3) a political stalemate, with our nation’s politics remaining
competitive and neither party securing an enduring majority.
336. BALKIN, supra note 9.
337. Id. at 8 (“[T]he Reagan regime that has dominated U.S. politics since the 1980s is
slowly grinding to its conclusion.”); id. at 64 (“The Reagan regime is crumbling.”).
338. Id. at 8 (“Trump represents the end of the road for the Reagan regime.”).
339. Id. (“The opposition party—the Democrats—will begin a new political regime and
a new cycle of political time.”).
340. Id. at 6 (“[O]ne can’t be entirely sure of the future”); id. at 22 (“We won’t really
know if Trump is a disjunctive president for several years after he leaves office.”); id. at 27
(“In politics, as in life, . . . nothing is certain.”).
341. Id. at 3 (“I will use tools from constitutional theory and from political science to try
to explain what is happening to American politics: how we got where we are, and where we
are likely to be headed in the next few decades.”).
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A. Institutional Legitimacy, Regime Theory, and the Constraints
of Constitutional Politics
Political scientists offer two competing visions of American
politics. On one view, political actors are free to act—or not—as
they wish, and their successes (or failures) turn on their own
strategic choices.342 On this view, each political actor controls her
own destiny and is free to act anew (or not) as she deems fit.343
When she succeeds, she deserves all of the praise. And when she
fails, she has no one to blame but herself. Within the field of public
law, this is the vision—more or less—of legalists, attitudinalists,
and rational-choice scholars alike.344
At the same time, regime theorists offer a competing vision.
This vision is rooted in the constraints shaping the actions of each
political actor.345 On this view, an actor’s place in political time
constrains the politics that she may make at any given moment—in
other words, her ability to pursue her own policy goals or, more
ambitiously, reshape our nation’s core commitments.346 These
patterns similarly constrain Supreme Court Justices.347
This vision of politics emerges from the political science
literature on American Political Development (APD).348 As Paul
342. For a helpful overview of this perspective, see Kenneth A. Schepsle, Rational Choice
Institutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (Robert E.
Goodin ed., 2006).
343. For an influential account applying this view to the presidency, see RICHARD E.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990).
344. For an overview of these competing models, see Kahn & Kersch, supra note 46, at
4–7 and Howard Gillman, The Courts as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive
Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 67–70 (Cornell W. Clayton
& Howard Gillman eds., 1999). For an influential example of the legalist model, see
Mendelson, supra note 24. For the canonical statement of the attitudinal model, see SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 13. For key works on the rational-choice model, see FORREST MALTZMAN,
JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look
Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000).
345. See Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory
Building in the Fullness of Time, 38 NOMOS 111, 113 (1996).
346. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 33–34.
347. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 3.
348. For the pioneering works in American Political Development, see THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992); KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL

1538

1539

Supreme Court Legitimacy

Frymer explains, “APD scholars are interested in the historical
progression of the nation-state, particularly the creation of
institutions designed to expand the government’s authority over
economy and society.”349 These scholars focus on how institutions
change (or stabilize) over time—often using historical methods to
understand how institutions emerge, transform, and decline, and,
in turn, how existing institutions influence the choices (and
opportunities) of political actors.350 These insights are at the core of
regime theory—particularly, Stephen Skowronek’s influential
scholarship on the presidency.351
Studying the flow of American history, Skowronek identifies
recurrent cycles of presidential politics based on how a president
relates to a period’s governing regime and whether that regime is
weak or strong.352 Instead of studying presidents chronologically,
Skowronek urges scholars to tend to certain political cycles—what
he refers to as the passage of political time.353 All told, he
distinguishes between four different categories of presidential
politics: “reconstruction” (an oppositional President in a weak
regime like Abraham Lincoln), “articulation” (an affiliated
President in a strong regime like James Monroe), “disjunction” (an
affiliated President in a weak regime like Herbert Hoover), and
“preemption” (an oppositional President in a strong regime like
Richard Nixon).354 Importantly, these patterns are also useful in
understanding the Supreme Court’s role in our constitutional
system—and, in turn, the opportunities (and constraints) facing the
institutionalist Justice.355
Traditional APD scholarship casts judges as enemies of statebuilding—with the Lochner Court serving as the paradigm

DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE
LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859–1877 (1990);
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982).
349. Frymer, supra note 46, at 779.
350. See Kahn & Kersch, supra note 46, at 8. To describe these dynamics, APD scholars
use the concept of path dependence—the familiar idea that “[p]ast social policy choices
create strong vested interests and expectations, which are extremely difficult to undo.” Jacob
S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social
Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 245 (2004).
351. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45.
352. Id. at 33–34.
353. Id. at 34.
354. Id. at 34–45.
355. Id.
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example.356 However, various scholars have revised this story over
time, explaining how judicial decisions can reinforce the actions of
the elected branches and, at times, promote the agenda of the
governing regime.357 This line of scholarship grows out of a classic
1957 piece by Robert Dahl, arguing that the Supreme Court
generally rules in ways that are consistent with the commitments
of the era’s dominant political party.358
For Dahl, while it’s possible for the Supreme Court to resist the
governing regime’s preferences for a short period of time, the
Court’s decisions eventually align with them—whether due to the
Supreme Court nomination process, threats from the elected
branches, or genuine shifts in the Justices’ preferences.359 While
Dahl’s account envisions a Supreme Court meekly following the
governing regime, later scholars argue that elected officials often
find it in their political interest to actively empower the judicial
branch—whether to settle an issue that’s dividing a political
coalition, stamp out outlier laws in states and localities, or strike
down federal laws that the governing coalition can’t repeal due to
the various veto points in our legislative system.360
Keith Whittington offers the leading account in this literature.361
Adapting Skowronek’s regime model to the relationship between
the President and the Supreme Court, Whittington analyzes the
Court’s “authority . . . to determine the meaning of the
Constitution” over time.362 Following Skowronek, Whittington
argues that the Court’s power to shape constitutional meaning
turns on a set of political cycles influenced by a governing regime’s
commitments (and strength), the President’s relationship to that
regime, and the Supreme Court’s relationship to both the governing
regime and the President.363
356. Frymer, supra note 46, at 787–88.
357. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583
(2005); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
ST. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993) [hereinafter Graber, Nonmajoritarian Difficulty].
358. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 280 (1957).
359. Id. at 284–85.
360. See Whittington, supra note 357, at 587–88; Howard Gillman, How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 511–13 (2002); Graber, Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 357, at 36.
361. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45.
362. Id. at xi.
363. Id. at 23–25.
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Applying this perspective to the challenge of tending to the
Court’s institutional legitimacy, each Justice must act within her
own set of constraints—shaped by the governing regime’s previous
choices, its core commitments, and the relationships between its
key players, including the President, Congress, the Supreme Court,
political parties, and legal elites.364 On this view, a number of
factors constrain the institutionalist Justice: constitutional
doctrine,365 institutional norms,366 public opinion,367 the
composition of the Supreme Court,368 the balance of power between
the political parties,369 the President’s political strength,370 the
relationship between the Supreme Court and the elected
branches,371 and the contours of elite legal culture.372 While the
institutionalist Justice is far from powerless before these forces,
no Justice can fully escape the constraints of her own
constitutional moment.
B. Analyzing Today’s Constitutional Regime: The Challenge of Tending
to the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy in a Polarized Age
In this section, I explore the contours of our current
constitutional moment—its political environment, its legal culture,
and the Roberts Court’s internal politics. In the end, the
constitutional politics of our polarized age threatens the Supreme
Court’s institutional legitimacy and presents a range of challenges
to Chief Justice Roberts and his colleagues.
1. America’s Polarized Politics: Divided Parties, Competitive Elections,

364. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 24.
365. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 593.
366. See Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the
United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847 (2013); Gillman, supra note 344, at 67.
367. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22; ROSEN, supra note 80; Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491 (1997).
368. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13; MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS II & WAHLBECK, supra note
344; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 344.
369. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 17 (2000) [hereinafter Graber, Jacksonian Origins]; Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends
of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998) [hereinafter
Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams].
370. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45.
371. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997).
372. See DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43; BAUM, supra note 43; Baum & Devins,
supra note 43.
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and a Gridlocked Washington
In 1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA)
published an unprecedented report calling for reform of our
nation’s political parties—Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System.373 At the time, both the Republican and Democratic
coalitions were ideologically diverse—with the Republican Party
including a sizeable Northern liberal wing and the Democratic
Party including a powerful Southern segregationist wing.
Frustrated with Southern attempts to block civil rights legislation
and driven by leading political scientists like E. E.
Schattschneider,374 APSA issued its report calling for ideologically
coherent parties—parties that offered clear choices to the voters,
received a mandate for their agendas on election day, and
promoted electoral accountability.
Over a half-century later, we now live in Schattschneider’s
dream world. Unfortunately, for many Americans, Schattschneider’s
political dream has become our own real-world nightmare.
American politics is more polarized today than it’s been since
Reconstruction.375 In Washington, Republicans have become more
conservative.376 Democrats have become more liberal.377 And
moderates are increasingly rare.378 Within the electorate, voters
have increasingly sorted themselves by party,379 and partisan
identity has become an important social identity—influencing how
we organize the world, sort friends from enemies, and separate fact
from fiction.380

373. See Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the
Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1950).
374. For examples of Schattschneider’s influential arguments about the role of
responsible political parties in the American political system, see E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960) and E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1948).
375. Lee, supra note 3, at 263.
376. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–74.
377. Lee, supra note 3, at 263.
378. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 73–74.
379. See LENZ, supra note 7, at 5–9; LEVENDUSKY, supra note 7, at 3; Bartels, supra note 4.
380. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 35, at 5–6; ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 4, at 3–8;
DONALD GREEN, BRADLEY PALMQUIST & ERIC SCHICKLER, PARTISAN HEARTS & MINDS:
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 3 (2002); Bartels, supra note 4, at 37.
For classic works on the influence of party identification, see ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E.
CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER & DONALD E. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960) and Philip
E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND ITS DISCONTENT
(David E. Apter ed., 1964).
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Of course, many of these trends are consistent with the 1950
APSA Report. And in some ways, today’s political system is
preferable to a party system that blurs the ideological stakes on
election day. Parties should offer voters a clear choice, and voters
should choose the party that matches their substantive preferences.
However, America’s polarized politics has strained our
Madisonian Constitution.381
For policymakers, there are only two pathways for overcoming
our system’s many veto points: an electoral landslide or a politics
of compromise. With our parties closely divided and our elections
highly competitive, landslides are rare—and with increased
polarization, so, too, is political compromise.382 Over time, political
dysfunction increases—with the elected branches unable to fulfill
campaign promises, pass new policies, or even do the cyclical tasks
of governing like passing a budget or raising the debt ceiling.383
Because of a closely divided electorate, control of government does
change. But the window for policymaking keeps getting smaller
and smaller.384
In short, well-sorted parties and widespread polarization are a
mismatch for the mechanics of our constitutional system.385
Polarization has also infected our legal culture.
2. A Fractured Legal Culture
For much of the twentieth century, the legal profession spoke
with a unified voice.386 Prior to the New Deal, conservatives
dominated legal culture—with the legal elite allying with Wall
Street and advancing a jurisprudence that prioritized property
rights and commercialism.387 Following the New Deal, legal culture
shifted—first, against Supreme Court review of economic
regulations, and later, in favor of the Warren Court’s efforts to
protect individual rights and promote equality.388 This new liberal
consensus transformed elite legal opinion—the views of the
381. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
382. HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 14.
383. Lee, supra note 3, at 274.
384. KREHBIEL, supra note 165, at 1–20.
385. Lee, supra note 3, at 275.
386. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 13.
387. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 247–68 (1992).
388. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 17, 19 (1999).
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Supreme Court Bar, partners in major law firms, members of the
Supreme Court press corps, and scholars in leading law schools.389
Of course, legal elites are an important audience for the
Justices.390 They closely track Supreme Court decisions.391 They
praise the rulings that they support. They criticize those that they
oppose. And their commentary shapes the reputations of the
Justices—both during their lives and for posterity.392 When this
large and influential audience speaks with a single voice, it exerts
an influence on the Justices—whether by shaping constitutional
common sense, threatening reputational harm, or promising
professional praise.393
With a common audience, institutionalist Justices can more
easily tend to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy—an ideal that often
trades on a shared culture and a commitment to constitutional
consensus. However, since the 1980s, legal culture has fractured.394
With liberals dominating many of the citadels of legal power
and prestige—academia, Supreme Court advocacy, leading law
firms, and the press—conservatives sought to build a legal
apparatus of their own.395 And following the Reagan Revolution,
Republican officials used their positions of power to empower
young conservative lawyers—lawyers who might later become
scholars, elected officials, judges, and even Justices.396 In turn, the
rise
of
the
conservative
legal
movement
spurred
countermobilization on the left.397 And so on.
Today, there is no single, dominant legal culture. Instead, there
are many different legal subcultures—with their own substantive
agendas, methodological preferences, and views about the
Supreme Court’s proper role in our constitutional system.398 These
subcultures represent powerful reference groups for the Justices—
both shaping their approaches to the law and (often) reinforcing
their preexisting policy preferences.399 These new audiences also
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 5–6 (1996).
DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 3.
Baum & Devins, supra note 43, at 1538.
DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 44.
Id. at 3.
See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 118; Lee, supra note 3, at 273.
GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 12–13.
See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 4–5 (2008).
397. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 43–44.
398. Id. at 3.
399. Id. at 2–3.
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represent a challenge to the normative appeal of any broad-based,
cross-ideological conception of Supreme Court legitimacy.400 In the
end, while there remain many legal norms and conventions that
distinguish lawyers from everyone else, elite polarization has
transformed legal culture—creating new challenges for the Roberts
Court and its institutional legitimacy.401
3. A Supreme Court in Transition: A Shifting (and Polarized) Political
Environment, a Stable (and Conservative) Court, and a Challenge
to the Roberts Court’s Institutional Legitimacy
In 1957, Robert Dahl wrote one of the most influential passages
in the judicial politics literature: “[T]he policy views dominant on
the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”402
This moment seems destined to test Dahl’s famous observation.
In today’s polarized America, no single lawmaking majority
dominates our nation’s politics.403 Our political parties are divided
sharply by ideology.404 Members of each party despise one
another.405 Our national elections are decided by the narrowest of
margins.406 And the winning party shifts from election cycle to
election cycle.407 Once in Washington, our elected officials can’t
work with members of the opposite party.408 Compromise is rare,
and gridlock is the rule.409 Even as popular dissatisfaction with
politics reaches historic levels, our nation’s elected leaders struggle
to act.410 With our nation’s politics sharply divided and no single
party in control, what would it even mean for the Supreme Court
to follow our nation’s governing regime?
But the challenge for the institutionalist Justice extends beyond
elected politics and popular governance. The legal profession itself
is also increasingly factionalized.411 And even the Supreme Court
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

BALKIN, supra note 9, at 118.
DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 3.
Dahl, supra note 358, at 285.
HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 3.
MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 204.
GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 12–13.
MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
Id.
Lee, supra note 3, at 274.
HETHERINGTON & RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 36.
MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 4, at 171–202.
See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 118; Lee, supra note 3, at 273.
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has been sorted by partisanship—with its conservative wing all
appointed by Republican Presidents and its progressive wing all
appointed by Democratic ones.412
At the same time, recent Supreme Court appointments have
strengthened the Roberts Court’s conservative majority.413 With
Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation, President Trump and Senate
Republicans replaced an aging, intellectual originalist with a young,
intellectual originalist.414 With the addition of Brett Kavanaugh,
Republicans traded the Court’s swing Justice for one of the leading
conservative voices in the lower courts.415 And with the elevation
of Amy Coney Barrett, they swapped a progressive icon for a
conservative one—representing (possibly) the most dramatic
ideological shift in a single Supreme Court seat since Clarence
Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1991.416 This new
conservative majority—young and intellectually formidable—is in
a strong position to shape constitutional law for decades.
Finally, with these new appointments, Chief Justice Roberts
takes his place as the formal leader of a sizeable conservative
majority.417 Over time, Roberts has emerged as an institutionalist
voice on the Court—preaching about the need for institutional
humility and the importance of tending to the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy.418
Given his position on the Court, Roberts still has the
opportunity to shape the Court’s agenda in important ways—
combining the Chief Justice’s formal authority over opinion
assignments with a (sometimes) decisive vote in key cases.419 With
successful coalition building, Roberts might still push the law in his
preferred direction in a number of substantive areas. However, he
can’t do it alone. Roberts’s conservative colleagues have the
412. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 2.
413. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 95; WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 299–300.
414. Grove, supra note 1, at 2242.
415. See Scott Shane, Steve Eder, Rebecca R. Ruiz, Adam Liptak, Charlie Savage & Ben
Protess, Influential Judge, Loyal Friend, Conservative Warrior—and D.C. Insider, N.Y. TIMES
(July
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/14/us/politics/judge-brettkavanaugh.html.
416. See Brett Kendall & Jess Bravin, Amy Coney Barrett: What Comes Next and How the
Supreme Court Will Change, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2020, 12:08 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amy-coney-barrett-what-comes-next-and-how-the-supremecourt-will-change-11603642087.
417. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 95.
418. Lee, supra note 3, at 273.
419. MURPHY, supra note 142, at 81–85.
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power—and the votes—to consistently outflank him. Perhaps
Roberts will go along with a conservative jurisprudential
revolution. Or perhaps he will look to slow it down. If so, Roberts
would have to bridge ideological divisions, build durable
coalitions, and exercise political leadership on the Court.
In the end, the Roberts Court is a Court in transition—albeit one
with a strengthened (and stable) conservative majority. Enter the
challenge to Dahl’s famous account.
Our overall environment—both legal and political—creates a
mismatch between competitive elections, shifts in party control,
political gridlock in Washington, a fractured legal culture, and a
young (and conservative) majority on the Supreme Court.420 These
structural factors may increase the Roberts Court’s power.
However, they also threaten the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
With the elected branches deadlocked, the Roberts Court has
greater freedom to act—as threats of popular reprisal diminish and
calls for public action increase.421 At the same time, with political
power shifting election cycle to election cycle and the Court’s
conservative majority locked in place, the threat of a legitimacy
crisis looms.422 If progressives manage to sustain political power in
the elected branches—at least some of the time—but also face a
steady barrage of defeats at the Roberts Court, they may come to
lose faith in the Supreme Court as an institution.423
With this looming threat, it’s little wonder that many
progressives focus their attention on Chief Justice Roberts.424 For
progressives, Roberts remains the most persuadable of the
conservative Justices—an institutionalist concerned with the
Court’s (and his own) reputation and eager to prove that the
Roberts Court can build coalitions that cross ideological lines. On
this view, the Chief Justice should learn from his role in NFIB v.
Sebelius and moderate his own conservative preferences in enough
key cases to guard against charges that the Roberts Court is nothing
more than a partisan tool of the Republican Party.425
However, following the confirmation of Justice Barrett,
Roberts’s own power has diminished. From the progressive
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 48, at 90.
Lee, supra note 3, at 273–74.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 299–300.
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community’s perspective, its lawyers must now attract another
vote on the Roberts Court in just enough cases to halt a conservative
constitutional revolution. The Chief Justice’s vote alone won’t do.
But this view is far too reductive. In our politically volatile age, a
range of Justices—from across the ideological spectrum—may fear
the threat of a legitimacy crisis and look to preserve the Court’s
institutional reputation. Furthermore, the Roberts Court’s future
remains uncertain.
C. The Roberts Court and Institutional Legitimacy: Three Future Paths
In this Section, I preview the Roberts Court’s future. To that
end, I chart three possible paths for our nation’s constitutional
politics: (1) a period of Republican political dominance; (2) a period
of Democratic political hegemony; and (3) an extended period of
political stalemate.426 Each scenario presents its own set of
challenges for the Justices and their efforts to preserve the Court’s
institutional legitimacy. I consider each scenario—and set of
challenges— in turn.
1. The Constitutional Politics of a Republican Reconstruction:
The Challenges of Constitutional Articulation
Republicans might complete a reconstruction of our nation’s
politics.427 For the Republican Party, the simplest path may have
been a resounding electoral victory in 2020—with President Trump
securing reelection and Republicans sweeping Congress. However,
this was far from the Republican Party’s only option.
Even with its electoral loss in 2020, Republicans might still
reconstruct our politics in the near future.428 In this scenario,
President Biden is the new Jimmy Carter—not FDR. President
Trump is the new Richard Nixon—not Herbert Hoover. And the
next Republican President is the new Ronald Reagan, not Dwight
Eisenhower—completing a Republican reconstruction, not settling
for a political role cast by the preexisting regime. (And of course,
that’s assuming that President Trump himself doesn’t become the
next Grover Cleveland!) Only time will tell. Regardless, the regime
politics literature offers us a way of understanding the dynamics of
political (and constitutional) change—including the distinct role
426. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 28–81; SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 33–58.
427. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 33.
428. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 28.
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that the Roberts Court might play as an affiliated Court within a
new Republican regime.429
Few American elections reshape the political landscape.430
Generally speaking, voters remain loyal to their parties over time.431
The parties themselves remain divided over a similar set of
issues.432 And few campaigns—or candidates—challenge a
governing regime’s core commitments.433 Sure, party control may
shift. New policies may emerge. And the losing party may predict
doom. But over time, few parties—or political leaders—are able to
shift the political status quo in an enduring way.434 However,
sometimes they succeed.
Sometimes a triggering event—a war, an economic crisis, or a
natural disaster—upsets the political equilibrium.435 Sometimes our
nation’s demographics shift—whether through immigration,
varying birth rates, or changes to the economy.436 Sometimes a new
issue scrambles our political coalitions—emerging from new
technology, a cultural shift, or a rising social movement.437 And
sometimes an old issue takes on new salience—redefining the
boundaries of our political parties.438 These developments reshape
our politics and remake traditional party coalitions.439
No matter the specific cause, the electorate realigns.440 The
parties battle on new political terrain.441 And the opposition party
emerges victorious—ushering in a long-term shift in our nation’s
politics.442 Sometimes this political realignment turns on a single

429. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 1–37; SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 1–26;
KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 1–32 (2004); JOHN B. GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN
REALIGNMENT: A MACRO- AND MICROLEVEL PERSPECTIVE 3–17 (1992).
430. See V.O. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3, 4 (1955).
431. See ACHEN & BARTELS, supra note 35, at 232–66.
432. See EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (1989).
433. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1983).
434. CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 432, at 10–11.
435. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE, supra note 374, at 86.
436. SUNDQUIST, supra note 433, at 108–14.
437. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 25; CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 432, at 4–12.
438. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: A SECOND LOOK 130–62 (2011).
439. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 25; Key, supra note 430, at 11.
440. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 433, at 4. But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL
REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE (2002) (criticizing the realignment literature).
441. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 374, at 80–81.
442. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 25.
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critical election.443 Other times it happens over a longer period of
time.444 Either way, the newly dominant party reconstructs our
nation’s political order—establishing a new governing regime with
new political leadership, new core commitments, and a new
policy agenda.445
As Stephen Skowronek observes, the President has often served
as an important leader in these pushes for reform.446 Famously, he
refers to these figures—leaders like Abraham Lincoln, FDR, and
Ronald Reagan—as “reconstructive” Presidents.447 These leaders
take over at a time when the governing regime is weak.448 They lead
the political opposition and emerge with a popular mandate to
begin anew.449 Over time, they reshape our nation’s political agenda,
realign its political coalitions, and force the supporters of the old
regime to acquiesce.450 In the process, they lead a new governing
regime—with a wide scope of action and a broad mandate.451
If the Republican Party completes a political reconstruction, the
Roberts Court would emerge as one of its key allies.452 In this
scenario, the Court would steer clear of a legitimacy crisis, and the
Chief Justice would be free to lead a conservative Court down a
new constitutional path—shifting our nation’s constitutional order
to match the new regime’s core commitments.453 Keith Whittington
describes this push as a politics of articulation.454 This is an unusual
posture for a Supreme Court in the early stages of a new regime.
To complete a constitutional revolution, a reconstructive
President—and his party—must usually defeat an oppositional
Court, filled with elite lawyers appointed by the party that
dominated the previous regime.455 However, the Roberts Court is
the product of our nation’s long (and unusual) political

443. Key, supra note 430, at 4.
444. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 433, at 294; V.O. Key, Secular Realignment and the Party
System, 21 J. POL. 198, 199 (1959).
445. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 25.
446. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 36–39.
447. Id. at 44.
448. Id. at 36.
449. Id. at 37–38.
450. Id. at 38.
451. Id. at 38.
452. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 80, at 1066–80.
453. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 113–19 (1991)
[hereinafter 1 ACKERMAN].
454. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 23 n.57.
455. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 69; Graber, Jacksonian Origins, supra note 369, at 17–20.
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interregnum. For decades, our nation’s political parties have
battled to a stalemate, with long periods of divided government
and neither party securing a clear political advantage.456 Simply
put, the Democrats never secured enough political power within
the old regime to build a progressive Supreme Court majority. As
a result, within a new Republican regime, Roberts would find
himself in the enviable position of leading an affiliated Court
during a time of political reconstruction.457
Of course, this posture constrains Roberts and his conservative
colleagues in certain ways. As Justices deciding cases within a new
regime, their main task would be to operate within it, not simply
follow their own constitutional vision or policy preferences.458 Over
time, the Roberts Court might look to push its own priorities in
certain areas. However, any innovations risk sparking new debates
within the governing coalition, leading to friction and, eventually,
division.459 At the same time, with any new Supreme Court
vacancies, Republican Presidents would look to replace the Court’s
progressives with strong conservative voices, perhaps shifting the
Court’s median Justice further to the right and weakening the Chief
Justice’s substantive influence on the Court.
In the end, the politics of articulation limits the scope of the
Roberts Court’s constitutional mandate, but it doesn’t eliminate the
Court’s influence on the regime’s constitutional politics. A regime’s
reconstructive moment leaves many questions unanswered.460
Reconstructive parties, like ordinary parties, often divide over key
issues.461 And reconstructive electoral mandates—like ordinary
electoral mandates—are often imperfect (and unclear).462 As a
result, a reconstructive moment both frames a new agenda and
opens up a range of new options for key regime actors, including
the Supreme Court.463
As Whittington explains, while “[a]n affiliated Court can be
expected to articulate the constitutional commitments of the
dominant coalition[,]” the Court also functions as an “orthodox
innovator[]” within the constitutional regime—”render[ing] new
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
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decisions and lay[ing] down new rules that can be explicated as a
mere working out of previously established legal principles.”464
Furthermore, because of the Court’s political insulation, it’s often a
useful ally for the regime’s political leaders—”mov[ing] forward”
on certain issues “where other political officials cannot[,]” whether
due to divisions within the governing coalition or the challenges of
an overloaded political agenda.465 In short, the Court “can be
inspired by the [regime’s] constitutional vision,” while “operat[ing]
outside the jumble of legislative and electoral politics.”466
Finally, while the Roberts Court would avoid a serious
legitimacy crisis, it wouldn’t avoid criticism from the Democratic
Party and its allies. Republicans might dominate the new period’s
politics. But the parties themselves would likely remain polarized.
And as the Roberts Court continued to shift constitutional doctrine
across a range of issues, the Court’s rulings would be sure to
outrage the political opposition. Over time, the Chief Justice and his
conservative colleagues might face pervasive backlash from (at
least) some parts of the progressive coalition (and legal academia),
even though they would face few—if any—public challenges that
attracted majority support.
Roberts and his conservative colleagues might seek inspiration
from the example of Chief Justice Taft and his Court. In the 1920s,
Taft received an avalanche of criticism (and his Court faced a wave
of court-curbing challenges) from union leaders, progressive
activists, and their elected allies—a response to renewed concerns
about the Court’s anti-regulatory decisions.467 However, Taft and
his conservative colleagues were never in any serious political
danger. Conservatives dominated the legal community and
Republicans remained the most powerful political force in the
elected branches.468 The same would be true of the Roberts Court in
a new Republican regime, at least on the political front. While the
Roberts Court (and the Chief Justice himself) might have to endure
sustained criticism from progressive activists and members of the

464. Id. at 24, 83, 84.
465. Id. at 125.
466. Id.
467. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 20 (1994).
468. Id. at 179–284.
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legal academy, its Republican allies would similarly insulate the
Supreme Court from widespread political reprisal.469
2. The Constitutional Politics of a Democratic Reconstruction:
The Challenges of Mediating a Constitutional Revolution
Democrats might complete a political reconstruction of their
own.470 For the Democratic Party, the simplest path would be to
build on President Biden’s 2020 electoral victory.
In this scenario, Democrats continue to win elections, securing
a history-defying victory in the 2022 midterms, retaining control of
the White House in 2024, and building robust majorities in both the
House and the Senate. Over a series of elections, the American
people decisively reject President Trump’s legacy and hold the
Republican Party responsible for his failed presidency. These
elections and our nation’s turbulent politics reshape traditional
party coalitions. New blocks of independent and Republican voters
support Democratic candidates. President Biden and his political
allies enact popular policies, earning the loyalty of new Democratic
voters and securing a clear political advantage over the Republican
Party. And the Democratic Party itself goes on to win again and
again. Over time, the new Democratic majority overturns the old
political order, builds a new governing regime, and transforms
American politics. Even so, the new regime would still face one
powerful constitutional obstacle: an oppositional Supreme Court.471
The President is a disruptive force in American politics.472 All
Presidents, weak and strong, challenge the existing political
order.473 However, few succeed in overturning it.474 Successful
Presidents advance a new political vision, challenge core regime
commitments, and build a durable electoral majority.475 At the same
time, this push for reform often runs up against well-established
constitutional doctrine and the rulings of an oppositional Court
filled with appointees from the old regime.476 This often sets up a
469. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54
REV. POL. 369, 370–71 (1992).
470. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 28–29.
471. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 72–73.
472. SKOWRONEK, supra note 45, at 19–20.
473. Id. at 120.
474. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 18 (1998)
[hereinafter 2 ACKERMAN].
475. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 28–81.
476. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 69; Graber, Jacksonian Origins, supra note 369, at 18.
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constitutional showdown between the President as constitutional
reformer and the Court as defender of the old constitutional
order.477 This conflict threatens both the President’s claim to a
constitutional mandate and the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
Each actor—the President and the Supreme Court—claims the
authority to define the Constitution’s meaning.478 The President
roots his claim in his own popular mandate.479 The Court grounds
its claim in its traditional role as our nation’s authoritative legal
voice.480 The Court challenges the President’s authority to reshape
traditional constitutional understandings.481 The President attacks
the Court as a counter-majoritarian institution that ignores the
Constitution’s true meaning and grants the opposing party
victories inside the courts that it is unable to secure at the
ballot box.482
In the early stages of a new regime, the oppositional Court
doesn’t back down from the President’s challenge.483 This should
come as no surprise. After all, the Supreme Court often emerges
from the previous regime as a powerful political actor.484 Even as
the old regime loses popular support, the Court retains its
important constitutional role, pushing ahead with its own agenda
even as tensions within the governing coalition increase and
political challenges to the regime’s authority gain strength.485 Over
time, the Court’s rulings crystallize the constitutional
understandings of the previous regime and frame the political
battles ahead.486
By opposing the reconstructive President’s push for reform, an
oppositional Court sharpens the lines of debate, blocks early policy
initiatives, and forces the new regime to consolidate its support.487
In response, the reconstructive President and her allies step up their
political attacks, issue court-curbing threats, and advance assertive

477. WHITTINGTON, supra note 45, at 52.
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constitutional claims, both inside and outside the courts.488 After a
period of constitutional conflict, the oppositional Court backs
down, concluding that the only way to maintain its institutional
legitimacy is to acquiesce in the new governing regime and accept
its core constitutional understandings.489
Enter the constitutional politics of the Roberts Court in a
Democratic regime. In this scenario, the Chief Justice leads an
oppositional Court within a newly established (and strong)
governing regime.490 As a result, Roberts and his conservative
colleagues face two central challenges. On the one hand, they look
to use the Court’s constitutional authority (and institutional
prestige) to defend well-established constitutional doctrine from a
Democratic assault. On the other hand, they try to protect the Court
from challenges to its institutional legitimacy.
Of course, Roberts would be far from the first Chief Justice to
face a serious legitimacy crisis. Most famously, in the 1930s, Chief
Justice Hughes sat at the center of a divided Court with a powerful
conservative wing challenging FDR’s emerging New Deal
coalition.491 Facing the challenge of a Democratic reconstruction,
Roberts might look to emulate Hughes, building cross-ideological
coalitions, protecting the Court’s institutional reputation, and
mediating a constitutional revolution.492
Roberts himself has already expressed admiration for the New
Deal-era Chief, a fellow institutionalist leading the Court during a
period of constitutional turbulence.493 Even so, Hughes had serious
tactical advantages that Roberts would lack. Although Hughes did
face one of the most perilous times in the Court’s history, at least
the political winds were clear. Following two electoral landslides,
FDR’s New Deal coalition was dominant.494 And while the Court’s
conservative wing stood firm against some of the New Deal’s
488. See KRAMER, supra note 117, at 128–44; Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court
Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009).
489. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 195–236; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 474, at 380–82.
490. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 95.
491. For an influential overview of the New Deal Court, see WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
492. JACOBSOHN, supra note 32, at 181–92.
493. See Adam Liptak, John Roberts, Leader of Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority,
Fights
Perceptions
That
It
Is
Partisan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/23/us/politics/chief-justice-john-roberts-supremecourt.html.
494. CUSHMAN, supra note 12, at 11–32.
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innovations, its members were aging.495 This combination of
Democratic electoral success and the prospect of near-term
vacancies offered Hughes both a clear signal and a possible escape
hatch. From there, the Court’s legitimacy crisis quickly gave way to
a sustained Democratic governing majority, new Supreme Court
vacancies, and FDR appointees loyal to the New Deal coalition.496
Facing a Democratic political reconstruction of his own, Roberts
would find no easy solutions. Unlike Hughes, Roberts wouldn’t be
able to rely on a string of new appointments to save his Court from
a legitimacy crisis.497 The Roberts Court would be an oppositional
Court with a young (and stable) conservative majority.498
Furthermore, in a polarized age, the Justices might be especially
reluctant to retire when the opposing party controls the White
House.499 After all, even within a Democratic regime, Republicans
would still win the White House every now and again.
At the same time, in the face of adverse rulings, Democrats
wouldn’t hesitate to step up their political attacks on the Court’s
conservatives and call for court-curbing measures to check the
opposition’s constitutional ambitions. This would open up the
prospect of sustained constitutional conflict between a conservative
Court and a progressive governing regime. This scenario would
place considerable pressure on the Supreme Court—and on
Roberts as its Chief Justice—to craft a jurisprudential solution to
these ongoing challenges.
With the threat of a legitimacy crisis, Roberts and (at least some
of) his conservative colleagues might agree to transform the
constitutional order in certain ways, but like Hughes, try to do so
on their own terms. In the face of court-curbing threats and a
jurisprudential tradition with decreasing normative appeal,
Hughes often joined with the Court’s progressives (and Justice
Owen Roberts) to mediate the New Deal Revolution and set a new
jurisprudential course.500 Chief Justice Roberts might try to do the
same—working to build cross-ideological coalitions in high-profile
cases, push back against the most radical claims of the constitutional
495. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 227–28.
496. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164,
1173-75 (1988).
497. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 96.
498. Grove, supra note 1, at 2242.
499. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 117; Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits
for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 813 (2006).
500. CUSHMAN, supra note 12, at 177–207.
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reformers, and strike a balance between traditional constitutional
understandings and the new regime’s core commitments.501
In the end, although the Chief Justice and his conservative
colleagues would retain some power within this new regime, they
would hardly control our nation’s constitutional destiny. On the
Court, Roberts himself would still play an important role as both
its Chief Justice and a member of its conservative coalition.
However, Roberts and his conservative colleagues would have to
act within the constraints of the new constitutional moment—
defined by the politics of a Democratic reconstruction.502 Of course,
Roberts and his colleagues would still hear cases and issue rulings.
But the Democratic regime—its Presidents, its Congresses, and its
legal elite—would set the terms of the new political (and
constitutional) order.503 The Chief Justice would still use his
institutional power to influence the era’s constitutional politics,
working to forge an uneasy compromise between established
doctrine, his own constitutional vision, and the Democratic Party’s
core commitments. However, the political context would limit his
constitutional authority.
In short, the Democratic regime would set the parameters for
the Roberts Court’s decisions.504 To preserve the Court’s
institutional legitimacy, the Chief Justice—and his oppositional
Court—would have to operate within them.505
3. The Constitutional Politics of a Political Stalemate: The Challenges
of Tending to the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy in a Polarized Age
Finally, America’s constitutional politics may remain
competitive and polarized, with neither party securing a political
reconstruction.506 This political stalemate would both empower the
Roberts Court and constrain it.
In this scenario, no single party dominates our nation’s
politics.507 The parties are sharply divided.508 And the American
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people distrust the elected branches.509 While the Supreme Court’s
power is far from unlimited, this form of constitutional politics
increases the Court’s political strength and bolsters its authority to
settle the Constitution’s meaning.510
At the same time, the nation’s constitutional future remains
uncertain. The parties engage in bitter political debates, and the
American people themselves remain sharply divided.511 The
Supreme Court may not face serious peril, but it still receives a
steady stream of attacks from activists (and legal elites) on both
sides of the political divide.512 And with legal culture fractured, the
Chief Justice struggles to build cross-ideological coalitions on the
Court itself.513
Finally, an even greater institutional threat looms. With elected
politics closely divided and Republicans securing a young (and
conservative) majority on the Supreme Court, many advocates
focus increasingly on what actors outside of the Court can do to
influence what happens inside of its walls. Democratic partisans
and their progressive allies call for aggressive measures like courtpacking.514 Legal elites coalesce around structural reforms like
Supreme Court term limits.515 And both parties remain comfortable
jawboning the Roberts Court whenever it serves their short-term
partisan interests.516
Of course, reformers have long struggled to negotiate our
political system’s many veto points and enact court-curbing
measures.517 However, progressive support for various
democratizing reforms, including an end to the Senate filibuster,
509. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 46; MCCARTY, supra note 4, at 4.
510. Graber, Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 357, at 36–37.
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512. DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 43, at 103–46.
513. Lee, supra note 3, at 273–74.
514. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at 96. For leading accounts of court-packing episodes
throughout American history, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 167–236; WHITTINGTON, supra
note 45, at 28–81; KRAMER, supra note 117, at 3–8.
515. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J.
148 (2019).
516. See Russell Wheeler, Should We Restructure the Supreme Court?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 2,
2020); Darren Samuelsohn, Trump vs. John Roberts: A 2020 Battle for the Supreme Court’s Reputation,
POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2019, 5:05 AM) https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/20/trump-johnroberts-supreme-court-reputation-088287; Philip Elliott, The Next Big Idea in the Democratic
Primary: Expanding the Supreme Court?, TIME (Mar. 13, 2019, 11:24 AM),
https://time.com/5550325/democrats-court-packing/.
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RUDOLPH, supra note 2, at 3; Clark, supra note 488, at 971–74.
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may eventually clear the way for legislative action, making courtcurbing a more realistic threat.518 From there, a cycle of attack and
retaliation follows, with Democrats packing the Court, Republicans
responding in kind, and so on.519 With no filibuster to protect it, the
Roberts Court remains vulnerable to political reprisal any time a
party manages to secure control of the House, the Senate, and the
presidency—altering our system’s political incentives, rebalancing
political power between the branches, and allowing the President
and Congress to exert increased control over the Court.520 Over
time, neither party emerges as a clear winner. But the Court—and
its institutional legitimacy—would surely be the biggest loser.
This outcome, though possible, is far from inevitable. In this
volatile political environment, Roberts may look to emulate Chief
Justice Marshall, working to convince his colleagues to prioritize
the Court’s institutional legitimacy by both issuing important
rulings that negotiate the tensions between various political
factions and shying away from decisions that might threaten
political backlash against the Court.521
Marshall became Chief Justice as the nominee of a lame duck
President (John Adams) of a soon-to-be-dead political party (the
Federalists).522 Once on the Court, Marshall faced strong political
(and constitutional) opposition, with President Jefferson and his
allies leading the charge against him.523 The Chief Justice fought off
serious court-curbing threats, survived the death of the Federalist
Party, and led an influential Court through an important period of
constitutional development.524 Over time, Marshall deftly managed
cross-cutting coalitions during the Era of Good Feelings and
maintained the Court’s institutional authority in the early Jackson
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years,525 forging unanimity, building the Court’s institutional
reputation, and constructing workable (and durable) constitutional
doctrine that received the support (or, at least, the acquiescence) of
key political actors.526 In the face of his own set of institutional
challenges, perhaps Chief Justice Roberts, a great admirer of the
Great Chief Justice, can do the same.527
CONCLUSION
In the end, the Roberts Court is far from powerless in the face
of treacherous political terrain. In a polarized America, the Court
retains considerable authority to define the Constitution’s meaning.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice himself has the opportunity to
exercise constitutional leadership. By combining his opinion
assignment power with his position near the Court’s ideological
center, Roberts has a chance to shape the outcome of the Court’s
most closely divided cases and decide whose voice should speak
for the Court, whether it is his own, the voice of one of his most
trusted colleagues, or that of a case-specific ally.
To borrow from Robert McCloskey, the Chief Justice has an
“opportunity for greatness,” an opportunity to shape the law in his
own image, move the law in the precise direction (and at the precise
pace) of his own choosing, and bolster the Court’s institutional
legitimacy.528 Of course, Roberts can’t do it alone. He must convince
a critical mass of his colleagues to join him on this institutionalist
mission. In our polarized age, this is no easy task. Even so, as an
institutionalist with a deep sense of Supreme Court history, Roberts
may hear the call of constitutional statesmanship.529 The key
question is this: Will he answer it?
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